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“Learning must be stolen, taken as a kind of bodily eminent 
domain.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
One January, two-year-old Jeffery Felice complained of pain when 
he urinated.2  Jeffery’s parents also noticed that the foreskin of his 
penis had difficulty retracting.3  They took the child to a physician, 
who diagnosed his condition as “phimosis”4 and recommended 
circumcision surgery.5  The surgery was performed on February 2nd 
by Dr. William Goodger, a first-year family practice resident, while 
under the supervision of a third-year surgical resident, Dr. Cynthia 
Glass.6  These two residents were the only physicians present during 
the surgery.  Dr. Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to perform the 
circumcision using the “guillotine technique.”7 
Although the cutting was typically performed with a scalpel, Dr. 
Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to cut Jeffery’s foreskin with an 
Electrosurgical Unit (“ESU”).8  The ESU consisted of a surgical pencil 
that operated by applying a high frequency electrical current to the 
cutting site.9  The unit had two modes, one for cutting and one for 
coagulation.10  Jeffery’s circumcision began with the ESU in the 
cutting mode with a setting of one on the power dial, but then was 
raised to two-and-one-half when the initial setting seemed to fail to 
make a cut.11  Thereafter, Dr. Glass instructed Dr. Goodger to cease 
cutting after he had cut approximately one-third of the distance 
across the foreskin. 
                                                          
 1. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS:  A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT 
SCIENCE 32 (2002). 
 2. Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 922 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). 
 3. Id. 
 4. BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 398 (38th ed. 1995) (“[Phimosis is] a condition 
of great narrowing at the edge of the foreskin for which the operation of 
circumcision . . . may be necessary.”). 
 5. Felice, 520 So. 2d at 922. 
 6. Id. at 923. 
 7. Id.  This procedure is described as the following: 
In this technique the foreskin of the penis is stretched past the end of the 
penis and clamped with a hemostat to hold the foreskin in a position to be 
cut off.  After the excess foreskin is cut away, the bleeding is controlled and 
the edges of the foreskin are sutured together.  Generally the cutting in 
circumcisions is performed with a scalpel. 
Id. 
 8. Id. at 923, 928. 
 9. See id. at 923 (identifying the theoretical benefits of the ESU as a reduction in 
bleeding at the surgical cutting site and the elimination of the necessity of “tying-off” 
the blood vessels). 
 10. Id. at 923. 
 11. Id. 
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Dr. Glass apparently saw that something was wrong because the 
child’s penis had retracted and was very pale.  Then she noticed that 
the child’s penis had sustained a full thickness burn,12 evidently due 
to excess electrical current running through his tissue.13  Jeffery was 
sent home from the hospital, but began to run a high fever.  Jeffery’s 
external penile tissue eventually sloughed off, leaving the 
unfortunate child with no visible penile tissue.14 
At trial in the malpractice case brought in the wake of the Felice 
surgery, Dr. Glass testified that “she had been trained to perform a 
circumcision with a scalpel in medical school and that she had not 
been instructed on the use of an ESU in circumcisions,”15 and that 
“[s]he had always performed circumcisions with a scalpel until one 
week before the Felice surgery.”16  The week before the Felice 
surgery, however, Dr. Glass and another resident had “discussed the 
possible benefits of using an ESU for a circumcision.”17  The court 
noted: 
Dr. Glass never inquired of her supervising doctors as to whether 
the use of an ESU was proper for circumcision surgery.  She did 
not inspect the literature or the manual to see if there would be 
any dangers in the use of ESU in circumcision.  Dr. Glass merely 
decided to try it and see what effect the ESU would have upon the 
surgery, since she considered it an improvement upon well-
established technique.  Dr. Glass also admitted that she had never 
held the ESU “surgical pencil” in her hand to cut the foreskin in a 
circumcision.  She twice had instructed two residents on a 
procedure she had never performed herself.  Dr. Glass also 
admitted that it was a precept of medicine that any modification of 
a learned technique would never be done without a full 
appreciation of all the risks involved in the modification.18 
One issue in the Jeffery Felice case was the potential vicarious 
liability of Dr. Glass’s employer.  That issue depended on whether the 
resident, Dr. Glass, had been negligent, a question that ultimately 
depended in large part on the standard of care to which surgical 
residents should be held.19  That question is the subject of this Article. 
                                                          
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  Dr. Glass then removed the rest of the foreskin with scissors, sutured the 
incision by hand, and applied an ointment to the burned area.  Id. 
 14. See id. (“Put in simpler terms, his penis was gone.”). 
 15. Id. at 928. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  After this discussion, but before the Felice surgery, the doctor instructed 
a resident to use the ESU to perform a circumcision and the surgery had no ill 
effects. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The court decided this question by holding that, for the purposes of the 
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The circumstances of the Felice tragedy illustrate the disaccord 
underlying the question of the standard of care by which the 
professional conduct of medical residents is to be judged.  This 
tension springs from the need to accommodate two potentially 
antagonistic, or at least dissonant, goals.  On the one hand, patients’ 
health and lives are at risk because they are treated by residents every 
day.  A significant quantum of the health care in the United States is 
delivered by medical school graduates who are engaged in post-
graduate residency programs (including those graduates traditionally 
referred to as “interns”).  But, moving from the microcosm to a 
longer term perspective, the health and safety of all of us depend on 
residents’ learning.  Residency programs are vital components in the 
education and training of physicians for the independent practice of 
medicine.  This is particularly true for the growing majority of 
physicians today who undertake a longer residency in preparation to 
practice a medical specialty.20  Respected physician and essayist Dr. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that 
The most essential part of a student’s instruction is obtained . . . 
not in the lecture-room, but at the bedside.  Nothing seen there is 
lost; the rhythms of disease are learned by frequent repetition; its 
unforeseen occurrences stamp themselves indelibly in the 
memory . . . . The bedside is always the true centre of medical 
teaching.21 
                                                          
vicarious liability of the employer of a third-year resident in surgery who held herself 
out as limiting her practice to surgery, the resident should be held to the standard of 
a specialist, namely a surgeon.  Id. at 928-29.  The court also affirmed the trial court’s 
finding that Dr. Glass was negligent in modifying the circumcision technique, the 
state was vicariously liable, and the medical school was independently negligent in its 
supervision of Dr. Glass during her residency training.  Id.; see also infra Part II.A.2  
(addressing the standard of care for licensed residents).  Neither resident was a 
defendant in this case.  Felice, 520 So. 2d at 924-29. 
 20. See infra notes 71, 74 (citing GAO reports which document the prevalence of 
medical specialties in the United States). 
 21. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Scholastic and Bedside Teaching, in IX THE COMPLETE 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS, 1842-1882 273, 276 (Riverside 
ed. 1911) [hereinafter DR. HOLMES WRITINGS].  Dr. Holmes was a respected medical 
lecturer and essayist who was also the father of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  He 
also noted the “great hospitals . . . are the true centers of medical education.”  
HOLMES, The Young Practitioner, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra, at 374.  In comparing 
the clinical education at the bedside with the classroom, Holmes commented: 
When I compare this direct transfer of the practical experience of a wise 
man into the mind of a student,—every fact one that he can use in the battle 
of life and death,—with the far off, unserviceable ‘scientific’ truths that I and 
some others are in the habit of teaching, I cannot help asking myself 
whether . . . there is not a possibility that we may sometimes attempt to teach 
too much. 
HOLMES, Scholastic and Bedside Teaching, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra, at 284. 
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This tension is candidly exemplified in the personal account of Dr. 
Atul Gawande from the perspective of a physician in training as a 
surgical resident: 
 In medicine, we have long faced a conflict between the 
imperative to give patients the best possible care and the need to 
provide novices with experience.  Residencies attempt to mitigate 
potential harm through supervision and graduated responsibility.  
And there is reason to think patients actually benefit from 
teaching.  Studies generally find teaching hospitals have better 
outcomes than non-teaching hospitals.  Residents may be amateurs, 
but having them around checking on patients, asking questions, 
and keeping faculty on their toes seems to help.  But there is still 
no getting around those first few unsteady times a young physician 
tries to put in a central line, remove a breast cancer, or sew 
together two segments of colon.  No matter how many protections 
we put in place, on average these cases go less well with the novice 
than with someone experienced. 
 We have no illusions about this.  When an attending physician 
brings a sick family member in for surgery, people at the hospital 
think hard about how much to let trainees participate.  Even when 
the attending insists that they participate as usual, a resident 
scrubbing in knows that it will be far from a teaching case.  And if a 
central line must be put in, a first-timer is certainly not going to do 
it. Conversely, the ward services and clinics where residents have 
the most responsibility are populated by the poor, the uninsured, 
the drunk, and the demented.22 
To underscore the point, Dr. Gawande relates his actions after his 
own eleven-day-old child suddenly went into congestive heart failure 
one Sunday morning from what turned out to be a defect in his 
aorta.23  Following a successful surgical repair of the cardiac defect, 
and nearing the time for the child’s discharge from the hospital, Dr. 
Gawande was forced to select a pediatric cardiologist to follow the 
                                                          
 22. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 24; cf. Gregory L. Larkin, Walter Kantor & John J. 
Zielinski, Doing unto Others?  Emergency Medicine Residents’ Willingness to Be Treated by 
Moonlighting Residents and Nonphysician Clinicians in the Emergency Department, 8 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 886, 888-90 (2001) (reporting that more than 72.9% of emergency 
medical residents responding to a survey during their final year in residency training 
would not agree to let an unsupervised resident treat them in an emergency 
department for a serious condition, and nearly forty percent would refuse to allow a 
solo resident to care for even a moderate injury or illness); see generally Samuel Keim 
& Carey Chisholm, Moonlighting and Emergency Medicine:  Raising the Standard, 7 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 927, 927 (2000) (commenting that perhaps proponents of 
moonlighting by residents to augment their experience may really mean “that they 
value this additional work experience, but not with their patients nor at their own 
hospital”). 
 23. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 31. 
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child and decide on his later treatment and surgeries.  When 
approached by the cardiac fellow who had spent the most time with 
the child, Dr. Gawande opted instead to have the child attended in 
the future by a senior member of the hospital’s cardiology staff.24  “I 
know this was not fair,”25 Dr. Gawande admitted.  But “[m]y son had 
an unusual problem.  The fellow needed the experience . . . . [but 
t]his was my child.”26 
The law of medical malpractice is one mechanism for protecting 
patients.  It does so by its liability rules that deter substandard 
conduct and provide compensation for victims.  The measure by 
which a health care provider’s professional conduct is assessed is set 
by the standard of care.  Our question is how the standard of care 
rules for residents should be formulated to strike a sensible balance 
between the goals of protecting patients while permitting the 
essential clinical education of residents.  Should medical residents be 
held to the level of expertise expected of reasonably competent 
general physicians, to specialists in the area of their residency, to a 
more subjective standard reflecting the level and stage of training of 
the particular resident physician in question, or in accordance with 
some other rule? 
These questions are important.  Resident physicians are commonly 
named as defendants in connection with injuries suffered by 
patients,27 and vicarious liability claims against hospitals depend on 
whether their employee-residents have committed tortious conduct.  
These questions have been given short shrift by the courts.  Analysis 
of the underlying conflicting interests has too often been desultory, 
inconsistent,28 and insensitive to the competing demands of 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 32.  Dr. Gawande elaborated: 
“You know, there is always an attending backing me up,” the young fellow 
said.  I shook my head . . . . I know this was not fair.  My son had an unusual 
problem.  The fellow needed the experience.  Of all people, I, a resident, 
should have understood.  But I was not torn about the decision.  This was my 
child.  Given a choice, I will always choose the best care I can for him.  How 
can anybody be expected to do otherwise?  Certainly, the future of medicine 
should not rely on it. 
Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Allen Kachalia & David M. Studdert, Professional Liability Issues in Graduate 
Medical Education, 292 JAMA 1051, 1052 (2004) (referencing malpractice insurance 
data which covered multiple teaching hospitals and more than 8,000 physicians and 
finding that residents were named in twenty-two percent of malpractice claims 
between 1994 and 2003). 
 28. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 81-82 (N.J. 
2002) (noting that few jurisdictions have confronted the question of potential 
liability when the patient receives misleading or inadequate information regarding a 
physician’s credentials or experience, or what potential causes of action might 
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immediate patient safety (through sound medical care at the 
moment) and the long-term demands of patient safety in general 
(through doctors highly trained in clinical practical medicine during 
their crucial residencies). 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of medical residency 
programs.  Part II briefly examines the approaches of courts to the 
question of the standard of care of medical residents.  In Part II, I will 
also discuss the potential use of the doctrine of informed consent to 
address the matter of the relationship between residents and patients.  
Part III proposes a different approach.  Rather than mediate the 
matter of treatment by medical residents exclusively through either 
the standard of care or the doctrine of informed consent (or some 
other information-based theory of liability), I propose a more elegant 
solution that melds the two doctrines.  It may be summarized as 
follows.  When medical residents (both not-yet-licensed and licensed 
ones) fully disclose their status, including their experience, training, 
education, and credentials, to their patients, then their performance 
should be judged by a standard of care commensurate with their 
actual level of post-graduate medical training, education, and 
experience.  Licensed residents should in addition, and as a 
minimum, be held to the standard of a licensed general practitioner.  
A resident (either licensed or not-yet-fully-licensed) who either 
affirmatively misstates or fails to disclose his status should not be 
permitted to avail himself of the standard that is commensurate with 
his limited experience and training.  If such resident affirmatively 
misrepresents his credentials and experience, then at a minimum, he 
should at least be held to the standard commensurate with the 
professional background that he claims to possess. 
When a resident fails to appropriately disclose his status, a not-yet-
fully-licensed resident should be held to the standard of care 
expected of a fully-licensed physician who has completed his 
internship.  A non-disclosing licensed resident actively participating 
in a graduate medical program to prepare him for a medical specialty 
should be held to the standard of the specialty covered by his 
residency program when serving in the capacity of a specialist, unless 
he can prove that the patient’s reasonable expectations were of some 
less demanding standard, in which case he should be held to a 
standard commensurate with those expectations. 
                                                          
apply); Justin L. Ward, Comment, Medical Residents:  Should They be Held to a Different 
Standard of Care?, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 283, 288 (2001) (stating that there are not that 
many federal and state decisions on the issue and that the existing decisions are 
inconsistent). 
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I believe that the suggested approach is a sensible compromise 
between the competing safety and autonomy interests of the 
immediate patients treated by residents and the longer term interests 
of the health care system and its patients in being attended by well-
trained physicians, particularly specialists.  If residents wish to be 
judged by a more forgiving, experienced-based standard of care, then 
a sincere and reasonable effort to inform their patients about their 
level of experience seems a suitable counterpoise. 
I should insert a caveat here.  Many tort claims arising out of 
injuries caused by allegedly substandard medical care by residents are 
also commonly asserted against one or more other health care 
providers.  Those additional potential defendants may include the 
attending-supervising physician and the sponsoring hospital-
employer of the resident, and may be based on theories of direct 
liability for inadequate supervision or monitoring of the resident 
and/or vicarious liability when a legally-sufficient relationship is 
deemed to exist between a resident who was a cause of a patient’s 
injury and another potential defendant-health care provider.29  The 
potential liability of these other physicians or hospitals that may be 
exposed to potential liability in connection with injuries inflicted at 
least in part by residents is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Rather, the focus here is on the narrower question of the standard 
of care applicable in assessing whether the professional conduct of a 
medical resident was negligent.  Of course, the outcome of the 
question of whether a resident was negligent may often be relevant to 
claims against those other health care providers who may be sued in 
connection with injuries contributed to by residents.  Thus, for 
example, in order to support a vicarious liability claim against a 
sponsoring hospital employer of a resident, one precondition is a 
finding that the resident-employee had committed tortious, liability-
producing conduct. 
I.  POST-GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING—
RESIDENCIES 
A “resident” or “resident physician” is “[a]n individual at any level 
in a graduate medical education program, including subspecialty 
programs.”30  The term “resident physician” evolved to reflect the fact 
                                                          
 29. See Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1053-55 (discussing the relationship 
between the attending physician and the sponsoring institution and the physician’s 
potential liability with regards to resident physician care). 
 30. AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL GLOSSARY, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/cate 
gory/2376.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
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that in the early 1900s, residents’ relationships to hospitals “[a]ll 
provided a similar experience of literally living and working in the 
hospital, tending to the moment-by-moment affairs of patients and 
observing the practice habits of eminent physicians of the day for 
several years.”31   
For present purposes, the term “resident” will refer to any 
physician who has graduated from medical school, and is 
participating in a post-graduate, hospital-based training and 
education program.  Residents include both not-yet-licensed physicians 
(formerly referred to as “interns”32) who are completing a shorter 
period of post-graduate training and education (usually one to three 
years) required in order to obtain a license to independently practice 
medicine,33 and licensed physicians who are continuing on in their 
graduate medical education and training in order to become 
qualified (board certified) in their chosen medical specialty (and 
sometimes in a further subspecialty).  There are currently about 
100,000 resident physicians engaged in this type of graduate medical 
education in the United States.34  A majority of these physicians not 
only are or will become licensed but will continue in a program in 
order to become qualified in a medical specialty, reflecting the fact 
                                                          
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931 (3d ed. 1931) (defining “residency” as a period of 
advanced medical training and education which typically follows graduation from 
medical school and includes supervised practice and instruction in a specialty in a 
hospital setting).  Other terms sometimes used to refer to some of these individuals 
“include interns, house officers, house staff, trainees, or fellows.”  Id.  The 
designation “fellow” is sometimes used “to denote physicians in subspecialty 
programs (versus residents in specialty programs) or in graduate medical education 
programs that are beyond the requirements for eligibility for first board certification 
in the discipline.”  Id. 
 31. RITA KWAN & ROBERT LEVY, AM. MED. STUDENT ASS’N, A PRIMER ON:  RESIDENT 
WORK HOURS 3 (6th ed. 2005) (emphasis added), available at http://www.amsa.org/ 
rwh/RWHprimer_6thEdition.pdf. 
 32. See AM. MED. ASS’N, HOW DO YOU BECOME A PHYSICIAN?, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/14365.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (“Some refer to 
the first year of residency as an ‘internship’; the AMA no longer uses this term.”). 
 33. Dr. Reuter notes: 
Although physicians receive their M.D. degrees at the completion of medical 
school, most states require at least one year of clinical training before 
granting an unlimited license to practice medicine.  Thus, the first year of 
residency is really an extension of medical school, in which the resident 
acquires additional knowledge and begins to make independent medical 
decisions.  
Reuter, supra note 40, at 485-86.  See also JAMA Patient Page, Your Doctor’s Education, 9 
J.A.M.A. 1198 (2000) (“After medical school, doctors must complete 1 to 3 years of 
residency training to be eligible to take the examination for their medical license”). 
 34. Sarah E. Brotherton, Paul H. Rockey & Sylvia I. Etzel, US Graduate Medical 
Education, 2003-2004, 292 JAMA 1032, 1033 (2004) (“As of December 31, 2003, there 
were 99,964 resident physicians enrolled in ACGME-accredited and combined 
specialty GME programs, the highest ever recorded by the National GME Census.”). 
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that more than two-thirds of physicians today are currently practicing 
in a medical specialty35 or subspecialty.36 
The principal accrediting organization for residency programs in 
the United States is the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (“ACGME”).37  It was established in 1981 out of a perceived 
need in the medical community for an independent accrediting 
organization for graduate medical education programs.38  The 
ACGME is a private, non-profit organization that accredits about 
8,000 residency programs relating to 119 specialties and 
subspecialties.39  A residency program, in its modern incarnation, has 
been defined as follows: 
A residency program is a period of education and training that 
physicians undergo after they graduate from medical school in 
order to learn how to care for patients in their chosen specialty.  
Most residency programs last from three to seven years, during 
which residents care for patients under the supervision of physician 
faculty and participate in educational and research activities.  
When physicians graduate from a residency program, they are 
                                                          
 35. See id. at 1033 (noting that “[t]he number of subspecialty programs increased 
13% during the past 6 years”). 
 36. The percentage of medical residents choosing a subspecialty instead of 
primary care has increased in recent years.  See Myrie Croasdale, Subspecialties 
Flourishing as IM Residents Shun Primary Care, 48 AM. MED. NEWS 1, 1 (2001) (reporting 
on internal medicine residents opting to pursue a subspecialty).  
 37. See Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., The ACGME at a Glance, 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_acGlance.asp (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2005) (identifying 101,810 full-time and part-time residents and 8,037 
accredited residency programs for the academic year 2004-05). 
 38. See id. (acknowledging the Liaison Committee for Graduate Medical 
Education as its forerunner). 
 39. Id.  Its mission is to improve the quality of patient care by improving and 
maintaining the quality of graduate medical education for physicians in training 
throughout the United States.  Id.  ACGME has “27 residency review committees 
(one for each of the 26 specialties and one for a special one-year transitional year 
general clinical program),” with each committee “compris[ing] 6 to 15 volunteer 
physicians appointed by the ACGME’s member organizations and the appropriate 
medical specialty boards and organizations.”  Id.  Its governance has been described 
as follows: 
The members of the ACGME Board of Directors are appointed in equal 
number by the American Association of Medical Colleges, American Board 
of Medical Specialties, American Hospital Association, American Medical 
Association and Council of Medical Specialty Societies.  The Board also 
includes two resident members, three public members and a federal 
representative appointed by the Department of Health and Human 
Services . . . . The ACGME governance structure also includes a Council of 
Review Committee Chairs, consisting of the chairs of the 27 residency review 
committees and the Institutional Review Committee, and a Council of review 
Committee Residents, comprising resident members of the review 
committees. 
ACGME Fact Sheet, infra note 40. 
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eligible to take their board certification examinations and begin 
practicing independently.40 
The accreditation standards of the ACGME Common Program 
Requirements address a number of specific areas.  These include, for 
example, provisions relating to supervision of residents,41 restrictions 
on duty hours,42 provisions for adequate free time,43 restrictions on 
                                                          
 40. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., ACGME Fact Sheet, 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_factSheet.asp (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2005) [hereinafter ACGME Fact Sheet]; see also Stewart R. Reuter, 
Professional Liability in Postgraduate Medical Education, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 485-86 
(1994).  Dr. Reuter describes residents as follows: 
  Residents are physicians in transition.  They have graduated from 
medical school and have the basic skills to practice medicine; yet, they still 
have much to learn to practice at the more complex level of the specialist.  
Even physicians entering family practice and general internal medicine serve 
residency programs and become board certified in these specialties. 
  The first year of postgraduate education is either transitional (also called 
preliminary, rotating, or flexible) or categorical.  In the former, first-year 
residents rotate through various specialties, usually medicine, surgery, 
obstetrics, and pediatrics, broadening their general medical knowledge.  
Trainees selecting a transitional year generally move on to one of the 
specialties that requires a preliminary clinical year but does not have an 
integrated categorical year, such as radiology, pathology, or anesthesiology.  
Transitional years are relatively unregulated by national accrediting 
organizations and the content is largely at the discretion of the teaching 
hospital or the medical school that supervises the teaching hospital. 
  The categorical year, on the other hand, is really the first year of a 
residency program in one of the more direct patient care specialties, such as 
medicine, surgery, pediatrics, or obstetrics-gynecology.  Also, medical school 
graduates who want to enter surgical subspecialties serve a preliminary year 
of general surgery residency and then move to ophthalmology, orthopedics, 
urology, and the like.  Residencies are three to seven years long and lead, 
following a qualifying examination, to board certification in the specialty. 
Id. 
 41. The requirements provide: 
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment 
A. Supervision of Residents  
  1. All patient care must be supervised by qualified faculty.  The program 
director must ensure, direct, and document adequate supervision of 
residents at all times.  Residents must be provided with rapid, reliable 
systems for communicating with supervising faculty. 
  2. Faculty schedules must be structured to provide residents with 
continuous supervision and consultation. 
  3. Faculty and residents must be educated to recognize the signs of 
fatigue, and adopt and apply policies to prevent and counteract its potential 
negative effects. 
ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., COMMON PROGRAM 
REQUIREMENTS 7 (2004), available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/d 
h_dutyHoursCommonPR.pdf. 
 42. The requirements state, in part: 
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment 
B. Duty Hours 
  1. Duty hours are defined as all clinical and academic activities related to 
the residency program; i.e., patient care (both inpatient and outpatient), 
administrative duties relative to patient care, the provision for transfer of 
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on-call activities,44 and assurances against moonlighting that interferes 
with the program.45  Resident work hours have also been addressed by 
a few state statutes.46 
                                                          
patient care, time spent in-house during call activities, and scheduled 
activities such as conferences.  Duty hours do not include reading and 
preparation time spent away from the duty site. 
  2. Duty hours must be limited to 80 hours per week, averaged over a 
four-week period, inclusive of all in-house call activities. 
  3. Residents must be provided with 1 day in 7 free from all educational 
and clinical responsibilities, averaged over a 4-week period, inclusive of call.  
One day is defined as 1 continuous 24-hour period free from all clinical, 
educational, and administrative duties. 
Id. (emphasis in  original).  These ACGME mandated restrictions on resident work 
hours became effective on July 1, 2004.  ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. 
EDUC., NEW INSERTIONS INTO THE COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL CORE AND 
SUBSPECIALTY PROGRAMS [hereinafter ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS], available at 
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/dutyHours/dh_Lang703.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 
2005).  For an overview of this new policy, see Manda J. Seaver, ACGME’s New 
Requirements:  An Overview, 12 AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 11 (2003), 
available at http://www.aans.org/bulletin/pdfs/summer03.pdf (highlighting six 
substantive restrictions).  For background on the situation prior to the latest ACGME 
standards on duty hours, see Scott Turner, Medical Residency:  An Exercise in Sleep 
Deprivation, 26 GEORGE STREET J. (2001), http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Ge 
orge_Street_Journal/vol26/26GSJ06h.html (noting that AGCME resident work hour 
standards in the past too often were not observed).  For pending legislation in 
Congress addressing work hours of post-graduate trainees (fellows, residents, and 
interns), see Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2005, S. 1297, 109th 
Cong. (2005), H.R. 1228, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 43. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, III.B.4, at 8 (“Adequate time for 
rest and personal activities must be provided.  This should consist of a 10-hour time 
period provided between all daily duty periods and after in-house call.”). 
 44. The ACGME guidelines state: 
VI. Resident Duty Hours and the Working Environment 
C.  On-call Activities 
The objective of on-call activities is to provide residents with continuity of 
patient care experiences throughout a 24-hour period.  In-house call is 
defined as those duty hours beyond the normal work day, when residents are 
required to be immediately available in the assigned institution. 
  1. In-house call must occur no more frequently than every third night, 
averaged over a 4-week period. 
  2. Continuous on-site duty, including in-house call, must not exceed 24 
consecutive hours.  Residents may remain on duty for up to 6 additional 
hours to participate in didactic activities, transfer care of patients, conduct 
outpatient clinics, and maintain continuity of medical and surgical care.  [as 
further specified by the RRC] 
  3. No new patients may be accepted after 24 hours of continuous duty.  
[as further specified by the RRC] 
  4. At-home call (or pager call) is defined as a call taken from outside the 
assigned institution. 
a) The frequency of at-home call is not subject to the every-third-night 
limitation.  At-home call, however, must not be so frequent as to preclude 
rest and reasonable personal time for each resident.  Residents taking 
at-home call must be provided with 1 day in 7 completely free from all 
educational and clinical responsibilities, averaged over a 4-week period. 
b) When residents are called into the hospital from home, the hours 
residents spend in-house are counted toward the 80-hour limit. 
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In addition to any supplemental requirements developed by each 
specialty,47 the ACGME Common Program Requirements also include 
a condition that each residency program “require its residents to 
obtain competence in the six areas listed below to the level expected 
of a new practitioner.”48  These core competencies are described as 
follows: 
Programs must define the specific knowledge, skills, behaviors, and 
attitudes required, and provide educational experiences as needed 
in order for their residents to demonstrate the following: 
 1. Patient care that is compassionate, appropriate, and effective 
for the treatment of health programs and the promotion of health; 
 2. Medical Knowledge about established and evolving biomedical, 
clinical, and cognate sciences, as well as the application of this 
knowledge to patience care; 
 3. Practice-based learning and improvement that involves the 
investigation and evaluation of care for their patients, the appraisal 
and assimilation of scientific evidence, and improvements in 
patient care; 
 4. Interpersonal and communication skills that result in the effective 
exchange of information and collaboration with patients, their 
families, and other health professionals; 
 5. Professionalism, as manifested through a commitment to 
carrying out professional responsibilities, adherence to ethical 
principles, and sensitivity to patients of diverse backgrounds; 
 6. Systems-based practice, as manifested by actions that demonstrate 
an awareness of and responsiveness to the larger context and 
system of health care, as well as the ability to call effectively on 
other resources in the system to provide optimal health care.49 
                                                          
c) The program director and the faculty must monitor the demands of 
at-home call in their programs, and make scheduling adjustments as 
necessary to mitigate excessive service demands and/or fatigue. 
Id. VI.C., at 8.  Not long ago, residents, provided most on-call services at teaching 
hospitals.  Reuter, supra note 40, at 517. 
 45. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.D.1, at 8 (providing inter alia 
that “[b]ecause residency education is a full-time endeavor, the program director 
must ensure that moonlighting does not interfere with the ability of the resident to 
achieve the goals and objectives of the educational program”). 
 46. For background on the New York statutory regulation of resident work hours, 
see Alan S. Boulos & A. John Popp, Resident Work Hour Restrictions:  The New York 
Experience, 12 AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 16, 16 (2003), available at 
http://www.aans.org/bulletin/pdfs/summer03.pdf (identifying New York as ahead 
of the curve for placing restrictions on resident work hours). 
 47. ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, at 1. 
 48. Id. at 6.  
 49. Id. at 6-7. 
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Residents’ training is to a substantial extent clinical and practice-
based.50  This is reflected in the core competencies providing for 
application of medical knowledge “to patient care” and for needed 
educational experiences in “practice-based learning and 
improvement.”51  It is these core competencies and the clinical focus 
of residency training that are most relevant for our purposes. 
Medical residents may not be in the position to offer the level of 
care to patients that an experienced physician, particularly a 
specialist, could provide.52  There are a number of factors 
contributing to this reality.  By definition, residents lack clinical 
experience on a relative basis.53  Medical education and experience-
                                                          
 50. One doctor’s experiences in a surgical residency program are informative: 
  And it works.  There have now been many studies of elite 
performers-international violinists, chess grand masters, professional 
ice-skaters, mathematicians, and so forth-and the biggest difference 
researchers find between them and lesser performers is the cumulative 
amount of deliberate practice they’ve had.  Indeed, the most important 
talent may be the talent for practice itself.  K. Anders Ericsson, a cognitive 
psychologist and expert on performance, notes that the most important way 
in which innate factors play a role may be in one’s willingness to engage in 
sustained training.  He’s found, for example, that top performers dislike 
practicing just as much as others do.  (That’s why, for example, athletes and 
musicians usually quit practicing when they retire.)  But more than others, 
they have the will to keep at it anyway. 
  I still have no idea what I did differently that day.  But from then on, my 
lines went in.  Practice is funny that way.  For days and days, you make out 
only the fragments of what to do.  And then one day you’ve got the thing 
whole.  Conscious learning becomes unconscious knowledge, and you 
cannot say precisely how. 
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
 51. Some specialties elaborate.  Thus, for example, the Resident Review 
Committee for internal medicine has adopted the following program guideline:  
“Residents must have direct patient responsibility, including participation in 
diagnosis, management, and admission decisions across the broad spectrum of 
medical, surgical, and psychiatric illnesses, such that the residents learn how to 
determine which patients require hospitalization.”  ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR 
GRADUATE MED. EDUC., PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDENCY EDUCATION IN 
INTERNAL MEDICINE 21 (2004), available at http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/downlo 
ads/RRC_progReq/140pr703_u704.pdf. 
 52. See, e.g., A. Antoine Kazzi et al., Emergency Medicine Residency Applicant 
Educational Debt:  Relationship with Attitude Toward Training and Moonlighting, 7 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 1399, 1405 (2000) (reporting that emergency medicine residents 
acknowledge “a higher risk of adverse outcome when practicing prior to completion 
of EM training”). 
 53. Thus, Dr. Gawande writes: 
  No matter how accomplished, surgeons trying something new got worse 
before they got better, and the learning curve proved longer, and affected by 
a far more complicated range of factors, than anyone had realized.  It’s all 
stark confirmation that you can’t train novices without compromising patient 
care. 
  This, I suspect, is the reason for the physician’s dodge:  the “I just assist” 
rap; the “We have a new procedure for this that you are perfect for” speech; 
the “You need a central line” without the “I am still learning how to do this.”  
Sometimes we do feel obliged to admit when we’re doing something for the 
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based training are most accurately thought of as parts of a 
continuum,54 from medical students to board certified specialists and 
subspecialists, and then throughout one’s medical career.  Dr. 
Stewart Reuter describes the learning curve during residency this way: 
Residencies are really preceptorships, in which the students learn 
by caring for patients under the watchful eye of a university faculty 
member or an attending private practitioner.  The ACGME 
requires graduated, progressive responsibility by the residents as 
they move from year to year of residency.  Thus, a first-year surgery 
resident primarily assists a board certified teaching surgeon.  
However, as they advance into their third and fourth years of 
training, surgical residents begin to perform simple operations by 
themselves.  By their fifth year, they may perform complex 
operations without the immediate supervision of the faculty 
surgeon.  In a pathology residency, the first-year resident probably 
interprets all slides side-by-side with a faculty member, progressing 
to a situation in the fourth year in which the resident interprets 
pathological materials semi-independently, with a faculty member 
available nearby for consultation in case the resident is uncertain 
about a diagnosis.55 
Moreover, although the ACGME continues to address the problem 
of resident hours in their accreditation standards,56 the reality may be 
                                                          
first time, but even then we tend to quote the published success rates-which 
are virtually always from experienced surgeons.  Do we ever tell patients that 
because we are still new at something, their risks will inevitably be higher, 
and that they’d likely do better with others who are more experienced?  Do 
we ever say that we need them to agree to it anyway?  I’ve never seen it.  
Given the stakes, who in their right mind would agree to be practiced upon?  
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 30. 
 54. This continuum of learning transcends medical school and even the 
residency experience, and continues throughout one’s professional medical life.  It 
has been described by one doctor nearing the end of his residency as he reflected on 
the insights shared by his father: 
Only now, as I get glimpses of the end of my training, have I begun to think 
hard about my father’s success.  For most of residency, I thought of surgery 
as a more or less fixed body of knowledge and skill which is acquired in 
training and perfected in practice.  There was, as I envisioned it, a smooth, 
upward-sloping arc of proficiency at some rarefied set of tasks (for me, 
taking out gallbladders, colon cancers, bullets, and appendices; for him, 
taking out kidney stones, testicular cancers, and swollen prostates).  The arc 
would peak at, say, ten or fifteen years, plateau for a long time, and perhaps 
tail off a little in the final five years before retirement.  The reality, however, 
turns out to be far messier.  You do get good at certain things, my father tells 
me, but no sooner than you do, you find what you know is outmoded.  New 
technologies and operations emerge to supplant the old, and the learning 
curve starts all over again.  “Three-quarters of what I do today I never 
learned in residency,” he says. 
GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 25. 
 55. Reuter, supra note 40, at 487. 
 56. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.B, at 7 (delineating duty hour 
guidelines to ensure residents receive adequate rest). 
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that residents do not get enough sleep.57  Not only are current duty 
hour guidelines still pretty high,58 there is also a problem with 
compliance with ACGME norms.59  Hospitals may sometimes be less 
than enthusiastic about restricting the work hours of their resident-
employees because “any duty schedule changes could involve millions 
of dollars in increased labor costs.  And teaching hospitals already 
face fiscal constraints due to decreased reimbursements for medical 
education.”60  There may also be resistance in some quarters in the 
medical profession to restrictions on resident work hours based on 
the perceived tradition in medicine.61  Surveys suggest that many 
medical residents moonlight,62 primarily for financial reasons,63 which 
                                                          
 57. See Turner, supra note 42 (noting in connection with ACGME work hour 
standards prior to the 2003 change that ACGME standards “go unobserved too 
often,” and that if residents do not get sufficient sleep, it “may be unsafe for 
patients”). 
 58. See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.B.2, at 7 (discussing eighty-
hour work weeks). 
 59. Turner, supra note 42 (noting that AGCME resident work hour standards in 
the past too often were not observed); see also KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 8 
(noting that some residents still work 114 hours a week despite the ACGME 
regulations); Craig Horowitz, The Doctor Is Out, NEW YORK METRO.COM, Nov. 3, 2003, 
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/health/features/n_9426/index.html (rep
orting compliance failures in some states that have adopted specific regulations that 
limit the number of hours residents may work in hospitals).  For accounts of the 
fascinating background of the impetus in the famous Libby Zion case for the New 
York resident work hour rules, see KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 4 (crediting Libby 
Zion’s death with sparking national attention to the issue of resident work hours); 
Horowitz, supra (discussing Sidney Zion’s litigation with the hospital in connection 
with the death of his daughter, Libby Zion). 
 60. Turner, supra note 42; see David M. Gaba & Steven K. Howard,  Fatigue Among 
Clinicians and the Safety of Patients, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1249, 1254 (2002) (“Since 
residents provide cheap labor, nearly all options for reducing their work hours are 
expensive—an estimated $1.4 billion to $1.8 billion per year nationwide.”). 
 61. See KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 16 (noting that “many physicians opposed 
the regulation of resident work hours on the grounds that it would create ‘time-clock 
medicine’ by forcing residents to focus on their timecard rather than patient care”); 
see also Turner, supra note 42 (“The medical profession has a mantra:  A fatigued 
doctor who is familiar with a case is better than a fresh physician who doesn’t know a 
thing about the patient.”); Dongwood John Chang & Susan Bell, The Impact of 
Residents’ 80-Hour Workweek on Neurological Training and Patient Care, 12 AM. ASS’N 
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS BULL. 1, 7-8 (2003), available at http://www.aans.org/bullet 
in/pdfs/summer03.pdf (documenting concerns that the ACGME’s restrictions will 
create a “shift worker” mentality, thereby eroding professionalism and limiting 
educational opportunities). 
 62. Moonlighting refers “to sporadic or part-time, unsupervised EM practice by 
residents in EDs or urgent care settings.”  Kazzi et al., supra note 52, at 1400 
(discussing moonlighting in the context of emergency medicine residents). 
 63. See Jeffrey N. Glaspy, O. John Ma, Mark T. Steele, & Jacqueline Hall, Survey of 
Emergency Medicine Resident Debt Status and Financial Planning Preparedness, 12 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 52, 53 (2005) (reporting that fifty-eight percent of emergency 
medicine residents who responded reported that moonlighting would be necessary 
in response to their financial needs and that more than a third presently moonlight 
in order to supplement their income); Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1253 
(“Incentives to moonlight are strong for residents because many have enormous 
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might exacerbate challenges resulting from long work hours and lack 
of sleep. 
There are also concerns that even when work hour guidelines are 
followed, residents may still lack adequate sleep because of the 
lifestyle activities while away from the hospital.64  Not only are there 
problems with inadequate levels of sleep, but also with erratic 
schedules and sleeping patterns of residents.  Residents must contend 
with circadian disruptions, a challenge said to be severe for residents 
in training.65  Inadequate sleep may affect the level of performance of 
residents already challenged by their inexperience.66  Studies in sleep 
laboratories report that for residents, “both at base line and after 
on-call duty, levels of daytime sleepiness are similar to or higher than 
those in patients suffering from narcolepsy or sleep apnea.”67  Fatigue 
and exhaustion may also foster resentment toward patients.68  
                                                          
educational debts.”); Kazzi et al., supra note 52, at 1402, 1404 (noting that 
moonlighting among residents is common, and is important source of income due to 
low salaries, long delays into financial stability, and education debt); MI Langdorf et 
al., National Survey of Emergency Medicine Resident Moonlighting, 2 ACAD. EMERGENCY 
MED. 308 (1995) (reporting findings that nearly half of residents surveyed stated that 
they moonlighted in some way).  The topic of moonlighting is specifically addressed 
in the current ACGME guidelines.  See ACGME, NEW INSERTIONS, supra note 42, VI.D, 
at 8-9 (including internal moonlighting as part of the resident’s eighty-hour weekly 
limit).  The practice of moonlighting by residents has also come under criticism by 
specialty segments in the profession.  See Keim & Chisholm, supra note 22, at 927 
(reporting the Society for Academic Medicine and the Council of Emergency 
Medicine Residency Directors’ position on moonlighting as “not an activity that is 
consistent philosophically with the missions of residency training nor academic 
emergency medicine”); see also Carey Chisolm & Brigitte Baumann, SAEM Board of 
Directors, SAEM Position Statement on the Qualifications for Unsupervised Emergency 
Department Care, 7  ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 929 (2000); Samuel Keim, CORD Board of 
Directors, CORD Position Statement on Moonlighting, 7 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 929 
(2000). 
 64. Andrew W. Gefell, Dying to Sleep:  Using Federal Legislation and Tort Law to Cure 
the Effects of Fatigue in Medical Residency Programs, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 645, 650-52 (2003); 
Horowitz, supra note 59. 
 65. Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1253 (discussing the circadian effects of  
clockwise shift rotation). 
 66. See Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1249, 1254 (noting that “[f]atigue is a 
common complaint of house staff, and many trainees (forty-one percent) say they 
have made errors that they attribute to fatigue”).  Gaba and Howard report that “[i]n 
the United States, medical professionals, especially residents, are working far beyond 
the limits that society deems acceptable in other sectors,” a practice that “is 
incompatible with a safe, high-quality health care system.”  Id. at 1254.  One national 
survey conducted in 1991 found that forty-one percent of residents attributed a cause 
of their most serious mistake to fatigue.  KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 7.  Numerous 
studies have shown that “[w]ell-rested physicians consistently outperform their sleep-
deprived counterparts in tests of memory, concentration, mathematical skills, visual 
attention, electrocardiogram interpretation, and anesthesia monitoring.”  Id. at 6-7 
(footnotes omitted). 
 67. See Gaba & Howard, supra note 60, at 1249 (finding that sleep studies clearly 
demonstrate that fatigue increases depression, anxiety, confusion, and anger, as well 
as impairs psychomotor ability). 
 68. See KWAN & LEVY, supra note 31, at 6 (observing that residency programs often 
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Ironically, although compliance with limitations on resident work 
hours may afford greater opportunities for sleep, some senior 
physicians complain that limitations on residents’ presence at the 
hospital may foster less preparation or engagement by residents in 
cases, thereby undercutting the residents’ educational experience,69 
and one might suspect, the continuity of patient care. There is also a 
question of how effectively or consistently senior physicians fulfill 
their responsibility to supervise residents in connection with patient 
care activities.70 
So here it is in a capsule.  Residents provide a lot of the health care 
in the United States.  For the first time they number over 100,000 
strong.71  They may also pull a laboring oar in hospital emergency 
rooms.72  The federal government is a major financial engine 
sustaining robust residency training programs.73  Moreover, the 
quantum of medical services provided by residents is likely to increase 
in the future since statistical evidence suggests that an ever greater 
percentage of recent medical school graduates are pursuing 
                                                          
disillusion residents and cause them to lose sight of the altruistic reasons many 
initially pursued medicine). 
 69. See Horowitz, supra note 59. 
 70. See Reuter, supra note 40, at 489 (“[H]ouse staff are frequently either 
marginally supervised or unsupervised as they care for patients, particularly at night 
and in busy emergency room situations . . . . The combination of inexperience, 
stress, and poor supervision result in a significant number of negligent acts by house 
staff.”).  Id. 
 71. See Brotherton, Rockey & Etzel, supra note 34, at 1076 (noting that the 
increase in the number of residents is probably a function of two factors:  the overall 
increase in the number of physicians, and the tendency of physicians to enter 
medical specialties); see generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, PHYSICIAN 
WORKFORCE—PHYSICIAN SUPPLY INCREASED IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN 
AREAS BUT GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES PERSISTED 2 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT TO 
THE CHAIRMAN], available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04124.pdf.  This report stated 
the following: 
The number of physicians in the United States increased about 26 percent 
from 1991 to 2001, twice as much as the nation’s population.  The average 
number of physicians per 100,000 people rose from 214 in 1991 to 239 in 
2001 and the mix of generalists and specialists in the national physician 
workforce remained about one-third generalists and two-thirds specialists. 
Id. 
 72. Even the courts seem resigned to this reality.  See Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 
171 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (stating that “there is nothing sinister in 
the employment by hospitals of interns to render emergency treatment to any 
patient of the hospital”). 
 73. See GAO REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, supra note 71, at 5 (“The bulk of federal 
dollars to support physician education is through Medicare’s graduate medical 
education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, which totaled an estimated $7.8 
billion in 2000, the latest year for which data were available.”).  The distributions are 
made to the teaching hospital based on the number of physicians trained and 
Medicare’s portion of the patients in the hospital.  Id. 
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specialties and subspecialties.74  But residents are not only delivering 
medical services, they are also in learning mode.  There is tension 
inherent in a resident’s role because in order to learn they must 
practice, meaning their “practice” involves “practice.”  We have here 
two goals, education and patient care, reified contrapuntally in 
medical residents. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS APPROACHES IN THE COURTS 
A.  Standard of Care for Post-Graduate Medical Learners 
The standard of care in medical malpractice cases is based on two 
core principles in negligence law:  first, that negligence liability is 
fault-based (rather than strict liability) and therefore requires proof 
that the defendant’s conduct was substandard, and second, that a 
person’s conduct should be evaluated according to objective criteria, 
rather than by a subjective assessment.75  I have previously described 
the professional standard of care as follows: 
[T]his objective standard in malpractice has usually been defined 
in terms of a professionally oriented standard that encompasses the 
teachings and practices of the medical profession.  Yet the courts 
and legislatures have differed on the form that such a 
professionally oriented standard should take, and on the extent to 
which they should defer to the practices of the medical profession 
in defining the relevant standard.  Under one common traditional 
construct, the standard of care for physicians was defined . . . in 
terms of “custom” or customary practices and medical lore.  Under 
a customary practice orientation, the focus was upon what had 
customarily been done.  The standard of care for malpractice 
purposes has increasingly been addressed by statute.  Although few 
statutes have expressly defined the standard in terms of custom or 
customary practice, numerous statutes contain language that seems 
(if taken literally) to focus on a standard based on what conduct or 
course has traditionally been followed, and thus are at least 
                                                          
 74. See id. at 7 (estimating that, in 2001, the number of generalists was 87 per 
100,000 people, and the number of specialists was 150 per 100,000 people, thus 
generalists represented 87 ÷ 239 = 36.4% of physicians whereas specialists were 150 ÷ 
239, or 62.8%).  The GAO’s classification system significantly understates the 
prevalence of specialists because it categorized physicians whose specialty 
information was listed as family practice, general practice, general internal medicine, 
and general pediatrics as generalists rather than specialists.  Id. at 17-18. 
 75. See Joseph H. King, Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard 
of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 49 (1999) (“[O]bjective means 
according to some external referent or test . . . . By contrast, a subjective evaluation 
would have an internal perspective, evaluating a person’s conduct in terms of his 
individual capabilities.”). 
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consistent with a customary practice perspective.  A number of 
statutes articulate the standard in a way that, at least facially, seems 
more demanding and normative than the customary practice 
formulation.  Instead of custom or habit, the standard of care is 
couched in terms suggesting a level of care expected of reasonable 
members of the defendant’s profession and specialty.  A number of 
cases, while retaining a professionally based perspective, have 
expressly rejected custom as a conclusive test . . . . Frequently, the 
professionally based standards have been defined not only in terms 
of professional practices (whether tied to customary or reasonably 
expected practices) but also with a geographic frame of reference, 
although some states have, to varying degrees, adopted a national 
standard.  Moreover, the applicable professional standards are 
usually those that existed at the time the alleged negligent conduct 
occurred.76 
As noted above, some state statutes address aspects of medical 
malpractice liability, including the standard of care.  Although these 
provisions vary in their particularity, usually the standard of care 
provisions have been sufficiently general to essentially leave the 
question of the standard of care for residents largely up to the courts, 
albeit sometimes under the cover of “statutory construction.”  For 
present purposes, this Article will not attempt to survey the multiform 
state statutory provisions. 
Although the standard of care for physicians and other 
professional health care providers has generally been governed by 
negligence law and accordingly largely depends on the existence of 
substandard conduct as determined by objective criteria, there has 
always been a certain “precariousness” in the fault-based and 
objective principles within the medical malpractice context.77  This 
wavering and tentativeness is also evident in cases addressing the 
question of the appropriate formulation for the standard of care for 
medical residents.  Really, this should come as no surprise.  
Negligence law has long been solicitous of children, for example, 
cutting them some slack to reflect the fact that children are often 
learning their way and are incapable of exercising the same level of 
knowledge and care as adults in similar circumstances.78  At the same 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 51-54 (footnotes omitted).  For background, see generally Joseph H. 
King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:  The ‘Accepted Practice’ 
Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975). 
 77. See King, supra note 75, at 50.  
 78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005) (stating that unless the child is under five or 
engaging in adult activities, the child is subject to the standard of children “of the 
same age, intelligence, and experience . . .”); see generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 124 (2000) (explaining in detail the negligence standards applicable to 
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time, however, children who engage in so-called adult activities are 
often held to the same standard as that expected of an adult under 
similar circumstances.79  This ambivalence is also apparent in the 
cases dealing with medical residents, who in a sense are also learners.  
With residents, the lines are less clearly delineated and the courts in 
less agreement. 
The case law with respect to the standard of care for residents has 
been sparse80 and in general less than lucid.  There are a number of 
explanations for this state of affairs.  First, although residents are 
increasingly named in malpractice cases,81 the most visible target 
defendants continue to be the attending or supervising physicians (or 
more experienced on-call physicians) and hospitals that sponsor or 
employ the resident.82  This has tended to divert or at least blur the 
focus from the matter of precisely how residents’ professional 
conduct should be assessed.  Second, there is sometimes ambiguity or 
lack of precision with the terminology referring to residents.  At one 
time, the medical community commonly used the term “resident” to 
refer to doctors who had been licensed and were engaged in training 
to become board certified specialists, while the term “intern” was 
used to refer to not-yet-fully-licensed medical school graduates who 
were in training required as a precondition to obtaining a medical 
license to practice medicine independently. Today, reflecting the 
lead of the AMA, a single monolithic term, resident, is the 
recommended usage to refer to all physicians engaged in graduate 
medical education and training, thus including both licensed 
residents and not-yet-fully-licensed residents (“interns”).  To avoid 
confusion, I will organize the following overview of the cases into two 
main categories:  not-yet-fully-licensed83 residents (who were formerly 
called “interns”), and licensed residents (who have thus completed 
                                                          
children). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10 
(stating that children are treated as adults when engaging in dangerous adult 
activities, such as operating a motor vehicle). 
 80. See Jistarri v. Nappi, 549 A.2d 210, 214 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting at 
the time that there was a “dearth of case law on the standard of care to be applied to 
a resident”).  Even so, the court was able to come up with examples of cases in which 
courts have applied  each of the broad standards.  Id. 
 81. See Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052 (noting that statistics from a 
malpractice insurer that covers multiple teaching hospitals showed that “resident 
physicians were named in 22% of claims between 1994 and 2003”). 
 82. See id. at 1053-55.  
 83. I hedge here with the “fully” qualification to allow for the possibility that a 
medical graduate may be authorized to engage in a limited practice for a time prior 
to completing his internship, which may be a prerequisite to becoming “fully” 
licensed so he might engage in independent practice of medicine. 
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their so-called “internship” and are pursuing training to become a 
specialist). 
1. Not-yet-fully-licensed residents 
There appear to be fewer malpractice cases involving not-yet-
licensed residents than licensed residents.  This should come as no 
surprise since not-yet-fully-licensed residents are less numerous than 
licensed residents because the training required for licensure is 
usually one to three years,84 whereas the overall residency training 
typically spans a number of years, typically three to seven.  In 
addition, first-year, not-yet-fully-licensed residents are subject to more 
direct and continuous supervision, and generally undertake more 
routine, less complex medical procedures. 
For a representative fact pattern, we can turn to the case of Rush v. 
Akron General Hospital85 where a not-yet-fully-licensed resident serving 
in a hospital emergency room86 treated a patient who had been 
pushed through a glass door.  This resident allegedly closed the 
patient’s wounds without probing them.  As a result, he therefore 
failed to detect two pieces of glass (one 3 1/4 inches long) lodged in 
the patient’s shoulder.  Here the resident was not sued individually, 
thus the court was called upon to decide whether the resident 
physician was negligent, thereby subjecting his hospital-employer to 
vicarious liability.87  That question in turn required that the court 
consider the underlying legal question of the standard of care by 
which this doctor’s conduct in the emergency room should be 
evaluated.  The Rush court adopted a fairly subjective formulation, 
one tied to the care that interns ordinarily possess under similar 
circumstances,88 but as we shall see, the cases are divided. 
                                                          
 84. See JAMA Patient Page, supra note 33. 
 85. 171 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). 
 86. He was assigned to the hospital emergency room on a 24-hour tour of duty.  
Id. at 380. 
 87. See id. at 381.  On the merits, following a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial 
judge entered a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict which was 
affirmed on appeal.  Id. (finding that “the evidence does not show the intern to have 
exercised any lesser degree of skill, care, and diligence than that required of a 
general practitioner working in this community; and, as a consequence malpractice 
was not proved”). 
 88. See id. at 381 (holding that interns were expected to possess and exercise 
“such skill and use such care and diligence in the handling of emergency cases as 
capable medical college graduates serving hospitals as interns ordinarily possess 
under similar circumstances,” and explaining that “[i]t would be unreasonable to 
exact from an intern, doing emergency work in a hospital, that high degree of skill 
which is impliedly possessed by a physician . . . in the general practice of his 
profession, with an extensive and constant practice in hospitals and the 
community”).   
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About the only safe generalization about the standard of care for 
not-yet-fully-licensed residents is that they are not entitled to a free 
pass merely because of their status as not-yet-licensed residents.  In 
Mercil v. Mathers,89 a claim was brought by the estate of a woman who 
died shortly after giving birth.  Dr. Powell, a first-year, not-yet-licensed 
resident,90 who assisted with the delivery, was among the defendants.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Powell and 
certain other defendants, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the remaining defendants.  Plaintiff appealed, challenging the trial 
court’s decision to dismiss the claim against Dr. Powell.  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed and reversed for a new trial.  Dr. 
Powell argued that because of his not-yet-licensed resident status he 
could not be liable.91  The Court of Appeals disagreed with this 
conclusion, responding: 
Dr. Powell’s status as a first-year unlicensed family practice resident 
does not shelter him from all legal duty, as the trial court 
ruled . . . .  Although doctors cannot be licensed until they 
complete their first year of residency, they can treat patients during 
that time.  If medical personnel provide treatment to patients, they 
have some duty towards those patients.  The general standard of 
care provides that a doctor must “use that degree of skill and 
learning which is normally possessed and used by doctors in good 
standing in a similar practice . . . . This flexible standard can 
accommodate a doctor’s status as an unlicensed resident.”92 
The court elaborated: 
Although Dr. Powell’s level of responsibility was not the same as 
that of the obstetricians, he clearly bore some duty towards the 
decedent.  Resolution of any question of negligence in such a case 
should not have been handled by dismissing Dr. Powell before trial.  
Rather, the jury should have been given the opportunity—aided by 
the expert testimony that was proffered—to determine if Dr. 
Powell was negligent under the standard of care applicable to an 
unlicensed first-year resident.93 
                                                          
 89. No. C3-93-140, 1994 WL 1114 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 1994), rev’d on other 
grounds, 517 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1994). 
 90. Note that this is a “first-year resident” in the current sense of the AMA 
definition, i.e., an “intern” under the old terminology.  See discussion supra note 30 
(explaining the changes in terminology pertaining to medical residents). 
 91. Mercil, 1994 WL 1114, at *4.  This was apparently what the trial court meant 
when it said that Dr. Powell “‘was basically an observer and helper . . . clearly under 
the direction of other [d]efendant physicians.’”  Id. 
 92. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 93. Id. at *5; see Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 698 N.W.2d 643, 655 (Wis. 
2005) (stating that even under a more subjective formulation, as discussed infra in 
text accompanying notes 97-101, a not-yet-fully-licensed resident did not enjoy 
immunity or automatically escape liability). 
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Thus, residents, even residents who are not-yet-fully-licensed, are 
not immune from legal scrutiny of their professional conduct or from 
concomitant potential tort liability.  But, this, of course, leaves the 
question, by what legal standard is resident conduct to be tested? 
The sparse case law has yielded divergent opinions on the standard 
of care.  Some cases hold not-yet-fully-licensed residents to the 
standard of care applicable to licensed non-specialists, or in other 
words general practitioners.94  Cases following this approach seldom 
articulate a clear rationale for their rule.  One suspects these cases 
reflect an overriding concern with patient safety.  Perhaps they are 
analogous to the same animus that explains why children engaging in 
adult activities are often held to an adult standard.95 
Other courts have applied a formulation to not-yet-fully-licensed 
residents that is somewhat more subjective.  Although the language 
of these courts varies, the underlying rule requires such residents to 
exercise that level of knowledge and care expected of other 
practitioners at a similar stage in their post-medical school education 
and training.96  A recent example of this similar-stage, same-class-
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 1390, 1392 (W.D. Tex. 1985) 
(applying Texas law and stating that the intern was subject to the standard of care for 
a “physician,” presumably meaning a non-specialist or general practitioner 
physician); Centman v. Cobb, 581 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ind. App. 1991) (holding that 
not-yet-licensed resident, or “interns,” are held to the standard of care of physicians, 
and stating that thus, “[r]egardless of whether Drs. Cobb and Garner were also called 
interns or first-year residents, they were practitioners of medicine required to 
exercise the same standard of care applicable to physicians with unlimited licenses to 
practice”); Davis v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., No. 204523, 1999 WL 33438841, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 9, 1999) (stating that “[i]nterns and residents are 
nonspecialists,” and suggesting that they are held to the standard of general 
practitioners); Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 497 N.W.2d 526, 528 (Mich. App. 1993)  
(stating that since interns and residents were not specialists, they were held to the 
same geographic frame of reference as general practitioners), rev’d on other grounds, 
528 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1995)  
 95. See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for 
children engaged in dangerous activities). 
 96. See, e.g., Mercil, 1994 WL 1114, at *4-5 (stating in a claim against a not-yet-
licensed resident, or in other words an intern, that the general standard of care 
requiring a doctor to exercise the skill and learning which is “‘normally possessed 
and used by doctors in good standing in a similar practice,’” and that “[t]his flexible 
standard can accommodate a doctor’s status as an unlicensed resident” who is to be 
held to the standard of care of an unlicensed, first-year resident) (internal citations 
omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 517 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1994); Rush v. Akron Gen. 
Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (holding that interns were 
expected to possess and exercise the degree of skill and care in emergency cases as 
capable medical college graduates and explaining that it would be unreasonable to 
expect from an intern, doing emergency work in a hospital, the same level of skill 
which is possessed by a physician in the general practice of his profession); Phelps, 
698 N.W.2d at 655 (holding in connection with a malpractice claim against a not-yet-
fully-licensed, first-year resident, that such resident was subject to the standard of 
care expected of unlicensed first year residents). 
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based rule is found in Phelps v. Physicians Insurance Company.97  The 
parents brought a malpractice claim against a not-yet-licensed, first-
year resident,98 and the hospital, seeking to recover damages for the 
death of their unborn son.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
not-yet-licensed residents should be held to the standard of care 
expected of an unlicensed first-year resident.99  The court emphasized 
that its rule was “based on the unique restrictions” imposed on such 
residents and their “unique status.”100  The court also took pains to 
emphasize that its standard did not mean “a grant of immunity”101 for 
such residents. 
2.  Licensed residents and other licensed physicians engaged in graduate  
medical education 
For present purposes, “licensed residents” will refer to physicians 
who have not only completed their traditional medical school 
education, but have also completed the training—usually consisting 
of an at least one-year “internship”—required to become fully 
licensed to practice medicine.102  Licensed residents and fellows103 are 
generally participating in a formal graduate medical education 
(“GME”) residency program through a sponsoring hospital in order 
for them to become “board certified” in a recognized medical 
specialty or subspecialty.  Most courts would hold such residents to at 
least the same level of care as that demanded of licensed general 
                                                          
 97. 698 N.W.2d 643. 
 98. Id. at 647.  The court of appeals stated that the defendant “was not a licensed 
physician” but “an unlicensed medical-college graduate who was undergoing his 
‘postgraduate training of 12 months in a facility approved by the’ Medical Examining 
Board, as a precondition to licensure.”  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 681 
N.W.2d 571, 582 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 698 N.W.2d 643. 
 99. Phelps, 698 N.W.2d at 655. 
 100. See id. (stating that although the resident could refer to himself as an “M.D.,” 
his authority and freedom of action was limited and more restricted than that of a 
fully licensed practitioner).  Specifically, the court noted that the defendant had no 
authority to provide primary obstetrical care or to act as the primary attending 
physician.  Id.  Rather, his primary duty was to assess and report findings and 
differential diagnoses to upper level physicians.  Id. 
 101. Id.  The court noted that such residents might still be found negligent in 
accordance with the provision of “sophisticated health care services appropriate to 
their ‘in training’ status” or where for example, “they undertook to treat outside the 
scope of their authority and expertise, or they failed to consult with someone more 
skilled and experienced when the standard of care required it.”  Id. at 656.  And, 
indeed, in the instant case the court refused to disturb a finding by the trial court 
that the resident had been negligent in failing to move the pregnant patient to 
Labor and Delivery and to contact more senior staff or the attending physician.  Id. at 
656-57. 
 102. See supra notes 30-33, 83-84 (explaining medical residency). 
 103. On “fellow” status, see supra note 30. 
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practitioners.104  That said, we still have the question of whether that is 
all, or may such residents also be held to a more demanding 
standard. 
Consider the following illustration: 
[A] patient . . . [complains of] chest pain and is seen by a first-year 
[cardiology] resident physician.  The resident physician reads the 
patient’s electrocardiogram (ECG) to the best of his ability—in 
fact, the interpretation is at least as good as one would expect of a 
resident physician at this level—but his reading misses a subtle 
finding that the average attending [cardiologist] would not have 
missed.  Believing that the patient does not have a cardiac etiology 
of pain, the resident physician sends the patient home without 
treatment.  He does not consult an attending physician; the ECG 
reading seems straightforward so that it is not obvious that 
supervision should be sought in the situation.  The patient later 
dies of a myocardial infarction.  In this case, has the resident 
physician met his duty of due care of appropriately interpreting the 
ECG?105 
If the resident were sued in a wrongful death claim for medical 
malpractice, how should a jury be instructed on the relevant standard 
of care to which such a resident should be held?  As summarized 
below, the cases have not agreed on the answer.  Moreover, in some 
jurisdictions, the issue of whether a practitioner is deemed a specialist 
may affect the geographic frame of reference of the standard of care.  
This is because whether or not some jurisdictions apply a version of 
locality rule in connection with the standard of care may depend on 
whether the defendant was a general practitioner or specialist.106 
At least three different positions are evident in the cases.  Some 
courts hold licensed residents to the standard of care applicable to 
licensed generalists (general practitioners), or in other words to 
licensed, non-specialist standards.107  This approach can be illustrated 
                                                          
 104. Ward, supra note 28, at 289; see Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052; 
see also Reuter supra note 40, at 490 (noting that residents are usually held to at least 
the standard of general practitioners “even though most do not obtain a license to 
practice medicine until the completion of their first year”). 
 105. Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 27, at 1052 (as modified in brackets). 
 106. See, e.g., Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 497 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Mich. App. 1993) 
(stating that since interns and residents were not specialists, they were held to the 
same geographic rule that applied to general practitioners), rev’d on other grounds, 
528 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. 1995)  For background, see generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW 265 (2d ed. 2000). 
 107. See McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Hawaii 
law and holding that a resident who had completed one-and-a-half years of a 
cardiology residency program was not to be evaluated by “an after-the-fact assessment 
of what one could expect from a doctor with comparable training and practice,” but 
instead apparently  by the standard applicable to a general licensed physician staffing 
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by the wrongful death case of McBride v. United States.108  A patient who 
had been treated at the hospital three days earlier for chest pain, 
returned again, experiencing severe chest pain.  He was seen in the 
emergency room by a licensed resident who had completed his one-
year “internship” and had in addition also completed about one-and-
a-half additional years of his residency program in cardiology.  Based 
on his examination and the patient’s electrocardiogram, the resident 
(although recommending hospitalization) acquiesced in the patient’s 
preference not to be hospitalized, and did not insist that he be 
hospitalized.  The patient died shortly after reaching home. 
At trial, the resident admitted that he had misinterpreted the 
decedent-patient’s EKG, but the Chief of Cardiology at the hospital 
testified that many residents would not have recognized the abnormal 
EKG tracings.109  Plaintiffs introduced expert testimony that “general 
practitioners” would have read the EKG accurately.110  The trial 
judge’s comments suggested that he believed the resident’s conduct 
should be evaluated on the basis of what one would expect of a 
“young resident” with similar training.111  In reversing, the court of 
appeals held that the standard of care does not vary according to the 
doctor’s “individual knowledge or education,” and should not 
depend on “an after-the-fact assessment of what one could expect 
from a doctor with comparable training and practice.”112  Rather the 
court suggested that a resident who had completed one-and-a-half 
years of a cardiology residency program should instead be subject to 
the standard applicable to a general licensed physician (presumably a 
general practitioner) staffing an emergency room.113 
A number of other courts have taken a different approach. These 
courts essentially hold that the standard of care for licensed residents 
is based on a sliding scale.  Residents are evaluated in accordance 
                                                          
an emergency room); Davis v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., No. 204523, 1999 WL 33438841, 
at *1, 5 (Mich. App. July 9, 1999) (stating that interns and residents are 
“nonspecialists” and, thus, are held to the standard applicable to general 
practitioners); Bahr, 497 N.W.2d at 527 (stating that since interns and residents were 
not specialists, they were held to the same geographic frame of reference as general 
practitioners), rev’d on other grounds, 528 N.W.2d 170; Baccari v. Donat, 741 A.2d 262, 
264 (R.I. 1999) (holding the resident to the “same duty of care as other physicians” 
with “unlimited licenses,” which presumably meant a general practitioner although 
the opinion is not entirely clear on that). 
 108. 462 F.2d 72. 
 109. See id. at 74.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 74 & n.2 (contending that the resident’s performance should be viewed 
“against the backdrop of his lack of special training and experience”). 
 112. Id. at 74. 
 113. Id. (reversing the trial court’s dismissal because it was based on an incorrect 
standard). 
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with others in the same type of residency program and at the same 
stage.114  Take, for example, the case of Sullins v. University Hospital of 
Cleveland.115  The sixty-two-year-old patient had been admitted to the 
hospital for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis.  Because of her 
past exposure to tuberculosis and reactor status, the attending 
physician requested an infectious disease consultation.  This 
consultation was provided by defendant, Dr. Woolley, an infectious 
disease fellow in training at the hospital.  The patient lapsed into a 
coma and died several days later.  Plaintiffs alleged that the fellow was 
negligent in undertaking the consultation on his own and in failing 
to timely diagnose the patient’s condition, which turned out to be 
tuberculosis meningitis. 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the hospital in the claim 
against it for the alleged negligence of the fellow, Dr. Woolley, a 
verdict based on a failure to find that Dr. Woolley was negligent.116  In 
affirming, the court of appeals approved an instruction by the trial 
court that “the existence of a fellow physician-patient relationship 
imposes on the fellow physician the duty to act as would a fellow 
physician of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of his 
training under like or similar circumstances.”117  Elaborating, the 
                                                          
 114. See, e.g., Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 314-15 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying 
Oklahoma law and stating that with respect to a physician who had completed three 
years of a four-year residency in general surgery, “it would have been improper to 
hold [a general practitioner] to a standard of an orthopedic surgeon, inasmuch as 
he was not board certified in that specialty” and had not held himself out as an 
orthopedist, but he “was properly held to a higher standard of care than that 
required of a general practitioner” given “his additional training and expertise”); 
Sullins v. Univ. Hosp. of Clevland, No. 80444, 2003 WL 195076, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Jan. 28, 2003) (approving an instruction by the trial court that “the existence of a 
fellow physician-patient relationship imposes on the fellow physician the duty to act 
as would a fellow physician of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of 
his training under like or similar circumstances,” and stating that “[f]or doctors in 
training (interns, residents or fellows), the standard of care is that of a doctor of 
ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of his training, under like or 
similar circumstances”); Maurer v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 614 A.2d 754, 758 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (stating in dicta that “[t]he standard of care to be applied to a resident is 
an intermediate one, higher than that for a general practitioner but less than that for 
a fully trained specialist”); Jistarri v. Nappi, 549 A.2d 210, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(holding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury to apply to the 
orthopedic resident “a standard of care higher than that for general practitioners but 
less than that for fully trained orthopedic specialists”); Fullerton v. Sacred Heart 
Med. Ctr., No. 19579-I-III, 2003 WL 21154151, at *3-4 (Wash. App. May 20, 2003) 
(holding with respect to a third-year radiology resident that the trial court correctly 
instructed the jury “that radiology residents have a duty to comply with the standard 
of care for the profession or class to which they belong,” and noting that the 
standard in the state was measured against a “yardstick of reasonable prudence”), rev. 
denied, 87 P.3d 1184 (Wash. 2004). 
 115. 2003 WL 195076. 
 116. Id. at *4. 
 117. Id. at *5. 
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court of appeals framed the standard of care as follows:  “For doctors 
in training (interns, residents or fellows), the standard of care is that 
of a doctor of ordinary skill, care and diligence at the same stage of 
his training, under like or similar circumstances.”118 
Some other cases have held licensed residents to a specialist 
standard of care.119  This approach is well illustrated by the case of 
Powers v. United States.120  The patient underwent cervical fusion 
                                                          
 118. Id.  The Sullins rule was recently extended to the persons in training to 
practice dentistry and dental specialties.  See Tarellari v. Case W. Res. Univ. Sch. of 
Dentistry, No. 84892, 2005 WL 1120007, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005) (holding 
that for a third-year undergraduate student of general dentistry and for a dentist in 
his second-year of graduate studies in endodontics, the standard of care is that of 
third-year students of general dentistry and second-year graduate students of 
endodontics respectively). 
 119. See Powers v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1084, 1099-1101 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(suggesting that in a Federal Tort Claims Act case applying Connecticut law, a first-
year orthopedic resident did “specialize in orthopedics” and was subject to the 
standard of care of other physicians “in the same line of practice” and in  “similar 
cases” in the relevant geographic frame of reference with respect to the 
postoperative evaluation and care of the patient, and further holding even though 
the resident “lacked the experience necessary to recognize the severity of [the 
patient’s] condition and the need for immediate corrective action,” his “failure to 
attempt additional diagnostic or surgical procedures at this stage constituted a 
breach of the standard of care”); Harrigan v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 177, 185 
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that for the purposes of the federal government’s liability 
based on the alleged negligence by a licensed resident in urology, a resident “acting 
within his specialty in urology” is held to the standard of care applicable to 
specialists); Valentine v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. Rptr. 26, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1961) (approving instruction holding resident to the standard and “duty of 
possessing that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by specialists of good 
standing practicing,” and stating that although defendant-resident “had only 
completed one-third of his residency, it would not seem at all unreasonable to hold 
him to a higher standard of skill than that required of the general practitioner”), 
overruled on other grounds, Siverson v. Weber, 372 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1962); Parmelee v. 
Kline, 579 So. 2d 1008, 1016 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a first-year neurology 
resident who was limiting her practice to neurosurgery and was holding herself out 
as a specialist in that area was classified as a specialist for purposes of determining 
the appropriate standard of care); Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So. 2d 920, 928 (La. 
App. 3d Cir. 1987) (holding that for the purposes of the vicarious liability of the 
employer of a third-year resident in surgery who held herself out as limiting her 
practice to surgery, she was held to the standard of a specialist, namely a surgeon); 
St. Germain v. Pfeifer, 637 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Mass. 1994) (implying that a first-year 
orthopedic resident, presumably a licensed resident, should be held to the same 
standards as other “more senior physicians,” which seems to imply a specialist 
standard although the opinion is not clear, an indecisiveness underscored in a later 
case discussed infra note 131); Pratt v. Stein, 444 A.2d 674, 708 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(stating that for the purpose of the vicarious liability of the hospital-employer of a 
licensed resident, a resident “should be held to the standard of a specialist when the 
resident is acting within his field of specialty”); Baccari v. Donat, 741 A.2d 262, 264 
(R.I. 1999) (holding a resident to the “same duty of care as other physicians” with 
“unlimited licenses,” which presumably means to a specialist standard, although the 
opinion is not explicit nor clear on this).  For more recent cases applying 
Pennsylvania law and reaching a different conclusion, see supra note 114 (applying an 
apparent intermediate standard). 
 120. 589 F. Supp. 1084 (applying Connecticut law). 
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surgery at a Veterans Association hospital.  An experienced 
orthopedic surgeon supervised three licensed residents during the 
surgery.  One of these residents, Dr. Biondino, was a first-year 
orthopedic resident who testified that the surgery was his first time 
performing a cervical fusion procedure for this type of problem.  
Nevertheless, he was, according to the court’s assessment of the 
operative report, “functionally . . . the surgeon.”121  In fact, Dr. 
Biondino and another resident operated on the patient’s neck at the 
fusion site while the supervising surgeon and another resident 
operated on the patient’s leg to harvest bone for the bone graft.  
Also, Dr. Biondino was primarily responsible for the post-operative 
care of the patient for about a month.122  The patient suffered severe 
morbidity from the surgery, including partial paralysis of the upper 
extremity.123  Apparently, his spine was fused at an excessively forward 
angle so that his spinal cord became impinged.124 
The court found that the surgical fusion was performed negligently 
and that the postoperative care of the patient “did not measure up.”125  
Importantly, although the court’s language was ambiguous, it 
suggested that the inexperienced surgical resident, Dr. Biondino, was 
being held to the standard of care applicable to a specialist—an 
orthopedic surgeon.  The court noted that the first-year orthopedic 
resident did “specialize in orthopedics”126 and was subject to the 
standard of care of other physicians “in the same line of practice”127 
and “exercised in similar cases” in the relevant geographic frame of 
reference.128  Thus, the court found that the performance of the 
cervical fusion surgery failed to satisfy the standard of care.  And, with 
respect to the postoperative evaluation and care of the patient, even 
though Dr. Biondino “lacked the experience necessary to recognize 
                                                          
 121. Id. at 1091.  The senior attending orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Raycroft, “testified 
that at the time of the operation he mistakenly believed that Dr. Biondino was a 
third-year orthopedic resident.  He was not aware that Dr. Biondino was only a 
first-year orthopedic resident until the time of trial.”  Id. 
 122. Id. at 1095. 
 123. Id. The defendant-resident Dr. Biondino attempted to explain the patient’s 
worsening condition on a psychological basis as hysteria.  Id. at 1094-95.  The court 
rejected that contention, choosing to rely instead on objective evidence that the ill-
fated surgery caused the patient’s condition.  Those objective bases included not 
only five electromyography tests measuring nerve root damage by electrodes, but also 
included the patient’s submitting to a sodium amytal interview which indicated the 
paralysis was real and not caused by psychological or hysterical factors.  Id. at 1097. 
 124. Id. at 1096. 
 125. Id. at 1100-01 (stating that “the surgeons who performed the plaintiff’s fusion 
failed to adequately take into account his unique, pre-fusion spinal condition”). 
 126. Id. at 1101. 
 127. Id. at 1099. 
 128. Id. at 1100. 
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the severity of [the patient’s] condition and the need for immediate 
corrective action,”129 his “failure to attempt additional diagnostic or 
surgical procedures at this stage constituted a breach of a standard of 
care.”130 
There are also a fair number of cases involving treatment 
administered by licensed medical residents in which the nature of the 
standard of care is unclear.  Sometimes the courts deliberately refuse 
to decide the legal issue.131  And, in other cases, the court’s language 
is unclear on precisely what the applicable legal formulation for the 
standard of care is for licensed residents.  Thus, in National Bank of 
Commerce v. Quirk,132 medical malpractice claims were brought for 
alleged spinal cord injuries to a newborn as a result of treatment 
during and following pregnancy and delivery.  The plaintiffs sued ten 
physicians employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical 
Sciences.  Two of those physician-defendants were licensed medical 
residents in radiology who were alleged to have misread an MRI.  
They both moved for summary judgment, contending that the 
plaintiffs had failed to present expert testimony showing that their 
conduct had deviated from the standard of care for residents in 
training.133 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of these two residents.  
The Court variously stated that the plaintiffs were required to prove 
the “applicable” or “required” standard of care, and that they had not 
done so, noting that the testimony of one physician expert related to 
the standard of care “for the staff radiologist,” and that he “admitted 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 1101. 
 130. Id.  
 131. See, e.g., Jarry v. Corsaro, 666 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).  In 
Jarry, at some point during her hospitalization, the child, Anastasia, suffered brain 
damage from lack of oxygen which resulted in a seizure disorder and mental 
retardation.  In the subsequent medical malpractice action, the jury determined that 
the residents had not been negligent.  Plaintiffs appealed, alleging “that the trial 
judge erred in instructing the jury that Drs. Kessler and Lee were to be held to the 
standard of care of a general practitioner.”  Id.  Plaintiffs contended that, “as second 
and first-year residents respectively, [they] should have been held to a higher 
standard of care because they (a) had received additional training in pediatric care, 
and (b) held themselves out as specialists.”  Id. at 13-14.  The Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals bypassed this argument and issue in a footnote, noting “that this case 
presents the question of the standard of care required of residents and interns when 
treating patients,” but that “neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has 
dealt squarely with the appropriate standard for residents beyond their first year of 
residency.”  Id. at 1014 n.4.  The court declined to address the issue because the 
plaintiffs had failed properly to preserve the issue for appeal. 
 132. 918 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1996). 
 133. Id. at 149. 
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he did not know what the standard of care was for a resident.”134  The 
Court then added vaguely that the plaintiffs had “not cited any 
evidence in the record to support the theory that residents should be 
held to the same standard as other licensed doctors.”135 
The problem with this statement is that whether residents should 
be held to a particular standard is a legal issue for the court to decide 
before the parties seek to establish factually whether that legal 
standard of care, as formulated by the court, was violated.  Thus, the 
Court implied that residents were held to the same standard as other 
“residents in training,” but did not explicitly or unequivocally decide 
the question.136 
3.  Restatements 
The current position of the Restatement of Torts on the question 
of the standard of care for medical residents is ambiguous and does 
not offer much guidance.  The matter seems to have been consigned 
to a silent interregnum between the Restatement (Second) and the 
proposed final draft of the latest segment of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts:  Liability for Physical Harm137 that is under active 
consideration by the American law Institute (“ALI”).  The black letter 
of Section 299A of the Restatement (Second) approved in 1965, 
which relates to “Undertaking in Profession or Trade,” provided that 
“[u]nless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, 
one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession 
or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally 
possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in 
similar communities.”138  Section 299A, however, does not address the 
question of the standard of care of a learner who is silent and makes 
no representations about possessing a specified level of skill or 
knowledge. 
The black letter language of the new Section 12 of the Restatement 
(Third) is couched in more general terms, and states that “[i]f an 
actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most 
others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be taken into 
account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a 
                                                          
 134. Id. at 150. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 149-50.  
 137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1 2005). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). 
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reasonably careful person.”139  The comments to Section 12 take a 
different, somewhat more nuanced approach, stating: 
A somewhat special case concerns learners or beginners.  Just as 
the law holds teenagers who choose to engage in adult activities to 
adult standards despite their inexperience, so adults who choose to 
engage in particular activities can properly be held to general 
standards, even when they are learners.  Yet while an actor’s status 
as a learner is in general ignored, there can be relationships 
between that actor and the other actor that attach significance to 
this status.  When, for example, the defendant, while learning to 
drive, receives a lesson from the plaintiff, and when the 
defendant’s inexperienced operation of the car causes an accident 
that injures the plaintiff, the defendant’s status as a beginner is 
taken into account in considering the defendant’s negligence and 
hence the defendant’s liability.  That status is ignored, however, if 
the defendant is sued by a pedestrian injured in the same 
accident.140 
Although both the broad language of Section 12 and the 
accompanying Reporters’ Notes suggest that it could be applicable to 
professional liability,141 the new Section 12 apparently was not 
intended to address professional liability.  This limitation is evident 
from the deliberations of the ALI at the meeting at which Section 12 
was discussed, during which it became apparent that Section 12 was 
intended to address exclusively nonprofessional negligence.142  The 
remarks of Professor Michael Green, one of the Reporters for the 
new Third Restatement of Torts, concur that Section 12 was not 
                                                          
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 12. 
 140. Id. § 12 cmt. b. 
 141. See Norman L. Epstein, 2001 Proceedings, 78th Annual Meeting, American 
law Institute 93 (Apr. 14, 2001).  Justice Epstein stated: 
The Reporters’ Note to Comment a makes a statement that this section “can 
be easily applied to cases involving the liability of professionals,” and in fact, 
the broad language that the black letter uses would include professionals, 
because there is nothing in it that indicates that it would not. It is a broad, 
generic provision, as I now read it. 
Id. 
 142. During the Institute’s discussion of section 12, Justice Epstein cautioned: 
It seems to me that the liability of professional persons and tradespersons as 
well is so substantial that it deserves a particular and explicit statement in the 
Restatement, so that we should either do this now . . . or we ought to 
explicitly recognize that we are not treating it at this point and will treat it 
later.  I understand it is treated in the Law Governing Lawyers with respect to 
attorney malpractice, but it does not appear to be explicitly treated in any 
other way, except generically in this provision as it is now stated.  It deserves 
a separate statement, and for that reason I move that we either treat it in a 
separate section or subdivision of this section or explicitly state that we are 
not doing so now but will address it at some future time. 
Id. at 93-94. 
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applicable to professional medical negligence.143  Accordingly, it 
appears that the standard of care for professional medical negligence 
will therefore continue for the time being to be covered by Section 
299A of the Second Restatement, presumably at least until the matter 
is explicitly addressed by a new section.144 
Turning then to Section 299A of the Second Restatement, we find 
the following language: 
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, 
one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a 
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge 
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good 
standing in similar communities.145 
                                                          
 143. The Proceedings state, as elaborated by my bracketed language which is 
needed for Green’s comment to make sense: 
Professor Green:  Let me just add, there is a connection between this section, 
§ 12, and the section in the Second Restatement that is referred to in that 
Reporters’ Note, § 299A, but I think what we can do here . . . is to make it 
clear that this speaks to the nonprofessional malpractice situation [and not 
to the professional medical malpractice situation] for which § 299A exists 
and remains until the project that Lance refers to comes into being and 
conclusion. 
Id. at 94; see also Temporary Summary Note to Section 12, 24 FALL ALI REP. 6, 6-7 (2001), 
which states (again with bracketed rationalizing language added): 
In response to a motion that the problem of professional and tradespersons’ 
negligence, treated in § 299A of the Restatement Second, be addressed in a 
subdivision of this section, in a separate section, or at some future time, the 
Reporter agreed to consider stating that this section [Section 12] speaks to 
the nonprofessional malpractice situation for which § 299A was fashioned 
and that § 299A continues to reflect the position of the Institute. 
 144. The Proceedings state: 
  Justice Epstein:  The problem with doing it that way is that § 299A is 
going to disappear from view, except as a matter of history.  If what we are 
going to present is the Restatement Third of Torts, then § 299A, if it is not 
brought forward in some way, is something historical but is not included. 
  Now if you are suggesting an explicit statement that § 299A remains the 
position of the Institute until it is addressed further, then that may be a little 
awkward, but I think that would do the job, and, if that is what you are 
suggesting, that would address my concerns. 
  Professor Green:  Well, you are really raising an important question of 
Institute policy that I don’t think any Reporters have it within their scope to 
address.  I can say that I think it has been the understanding of the 
Reporters who have worked on various projects of the Third Restatement . . . 
that whenever the day was done on the Third Restatement there would be 
many provisions in the Second Restatement that remained and still spoke as 
authoritatively as they ever did and would not be superseded by the Third 
Restatement.  That was our understanding, and I think this draft that you see 
here is consistent with that understanding.  Now that may or may not be able 
to be effectuated, but that is the assumption[.] 
Id. at 94-95. 
 145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). 
KING.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  3:08:07 PM 
2006] THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR RESIDENTS 717 
This Section, which is applicable to physicians,146 explains that “[i]n 
the absence of any such special representation, the standard of skill 
and knowledge required of the actor who practices a profession or 
trade is that which is commonly possessed by members of that 
profession or trade in good standing.”147  Another comment suggests 
that a person who represents that he has superior skill or knowledge 
beyond that common to his profession be judged accordingly.148  A 
person may also, however, in the absence of a contrary 
representation,149 “make it clear that he has less than the minimum of 
skill common to the profession or trade; and in that case he is 
required to exercise only the skill which he represents that he has.”150 
It is not clear whether this representing-the-standard-down option 
was intended to be available to professionals, or only to laypersons 
who have undertaken to perform a task normally reserved for 
professionals.151  In any case, the net effect of this convoluted stroll 
through the Restatements is that the Restatement does not offer 
much guidance on the problem.  This is especially true where a 
person—such as a medical resident—remains silent and says nothing 
to the patient about his status. 
B.  Informed Consent and Other Information-Based Liability Theories 
Most malpractice cases arising out of treatment by health care 
providers who possess less experience or training than others 
rendering similar medical services focus on the actual performance 
of the treatment in question.  Therefore, the question of the standard 
                                                          
 146. Id. § 299A cmt. b (stating that “[i]t applies to any person who undertakes to 
render services to another in the practice of a profession, such as that of physician or 
surgeon, dentist, pharmacist, oculist, attorney, accountant, or engineer”). 
 147. Id. § 299A cmt. e. 
 148. Id. § 299A cmt. d.  On the importance of representation, the Restatement sets 
forth the following: 
An actor undertaking to render services may represent that he has superior 
skill or knowledge, beyond that common to his profession or trade.  In that 
event he incurs an obligation to the person to whom he makes such a 
representation, to have, and to exercise, the skill and knowledge which he 
represents himself to have.  Thus a physician who holds himself out as a 
specialist in certain types of practice is required to have the skill and 
knowledge common to other specialists. 
Id. 
 149. See id. (clarifying that “[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only where 
there is no such special representation”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. The example used to illustrate this principle did not involve a physician.  The 
comment states:  “Thus a layman who attempts to perform a surgical operation in an 
emergency, in the absence of any surgeon, and who makes it clear that he does not 
have the skill or knowledge of a surgeon, is not required to exercise such skill or 
knowledge.”  Id. 
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of care for treatment purposes figures centrally in such cases.  In 
recent years, a second theory of liability has sometimes emerged in 
this setting.  This new kid on the block is the doctrine of informed 
consent.  This doctrine requires that a treating physician disclose the 
material risks of the contemplated medical procedure to his or her 
patient in order that the patient’s consent to the treatment be 
“informed.”152  Failing that, liability may be imposed on a non-
disclosing doctor for the material risks of the medical procedure that 
eventuate.  The jurisdictions are divided on whether the required 
disclosures should be determined in accordance with professionally 
based standards of what a reasonable medical practitioner would be 
expected to disclose, or by lay standards based on what information a 
reasonable patient would deem material.153  The profession-based 
standard of disclosure usually results in a more limited scope of the 
required disclosures because the duty to disclose then depends on 
expert testimony on whether the applicable professional practices call 
for the types of disclosure alleged by a plaintiff. 
Although of comparatively recent vintage, the doctrine of 
informed consent has become widely established in the United 
States.154  The doctrine has not been without its skeptics, both during 
its emergence,155 and continuing to the present.156  There has also 
                                                          
 152. See DOBBS, supra note 78, § 250, at 652-53 (exploring the principles 
underlying informed consent doctrine including autonomy, self-determination, 
“fundamental American values,” and medical ethics). 
 153. See id. at 655 (characterizing the medical standard of disclosure, established 
via expert testimony of the professional standard, as the older “camp” supported by 
case law and/or statutes in slightly more than half of states and tracing the origin of 
the standard based on reasonable patient expectations to three 1972 decisions); 
FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 313-14 (explaining the physician-based standard 
and reasonable patient standard); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You 
Experienced?  The Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 
18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 373, 380-91 (2002) (comparing cases that adopted 
the reasonable physician standard with those that adopted the reasonable patient 
standard and concluding that despite a nationwide trend towards the patient 
standard, the physician standard has retained its resiliency). 
 154. See Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 375-80 (tracing the evolution of the 
doctrine); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure:  Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 313, 315  (2002) (stating that “[i]n the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
legal requirement of informed consent became well-established in all fifty states”).  
In 2000, Georgia became the fiftieth state to accept the doctrine of informed 
consent.  Id. at 315 n.11. 
 155. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale?  Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 
137, 148 (1977) (questioning the level of disclosures physicians make to patients and 
observing that “disclosure and consent . . . are obligations alien to medical 
practice”); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed 
Consent:  A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 334 (1983) 
(observing that “informed consent as envisioned by the courts is a relatively rare 
phenomenon in the clinical settings that we have examined”); Aaron D. Twerski & 
Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts:  The Myth of Justiciable 
Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 648 (1988) (criticizing informed choice as a 
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been some resistance in the medical profession to the spirit of 
informed consent.157 
The doctrine continues to evolve.  Some commentators have even 
suggested that rather than attempt to expand the scope of informed 
consent, a newly packaged autonomy interest should be recognized 
to protect the patient’s right of informed decisionmaking.158  One 
                                                          
“sanctionless tort” based on the authors’ contention that decision causation is not 
justiciable in practice); Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent:  The Law’s Uneasy 
Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 751 (1986) (declaring that “the 
law has been far richer in its rhetorical devotion to the ideal of patient self-
determination than in its provision of effective legal redress to victimized patients”); 
cf. Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and 
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 367 (1974) (cautioning about the danger of the 
informed consent process turning into “a charade, a symbolic but contentless 
formality”). 
 156. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking:  
Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 398, 427 (1990) 
(concluding based on observations and interviews that the informed consent 
procedures that most doctors use “while sometimes meeting the letter of the 
informed consent doctrine, rarely [meet] what should be its spirit, i.e., providing 
adequate information and attempting to ensure that patients understand the 
information so they can make knowing and voluntary decisions about medical care” 
and lamenting that, in practice, “[p]atients are not protected; physicians are 
burdened with requirements that mean little; the law and society’s principles 
concerning individual autonomy and decisionmaking are effectuated in name 
only”); Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 81 (1994) (describing informed consent as “a charade”); 
Morris, supra note 154, at 316 (asserting that “[d]eference to doctors has replaced 
the duty of disclosure”); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:  Disclosure 
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1705 n.8 (1999) (questioning 
whether informed consent truly empowers patients or merely gives “the illusion of 
self-determination”). 
 157. This has been true for a long time.  Consider the words of Doctor Oliver 
Wendell Holmes:  “Your patient has no more right to all the truth you know than he 
has to all the medicine in your saddlebags. . . . He should get only just so much as is 
good for him.”  HOLMES, The Young Practitioner, in DR. HOLMES WRITINGS, supra note 
21, at 388.  Professor Cathy Jones identifies reasons that medical professionals 
commonly give for objecting to the duty of informed consent: 
[P]atients neither understand nor remember what they are told, in large 
part because the information to be conveyed is too technical for patients to 
grasp and is knowable and understandable only by physicians after years of 
schooling and training; testing patients’ understanding of what they have 
been told is too time consuming and too expensive in terms of the 
physician’s additional duties to this patient and others; patients want 
physicians to make decisions for them; [and] physicians can convince almost 
any patient to do what the physician thinks is best for the patient. 
Jones, supra note 156, at 407. 
 158. Morris, supra note 154, at 370-71 (urging acceptance of proposals made by 
various torts scholars “to replace the informed consent doctrine with a new tort that 
recognizes and protects the patient’s dignitary interest in informed medical 
decisionmaking”); see, e.g., Capron, supra note 155, at 350, 404 (suggesting a new 
ground for recovery, building upon negligence and battery theories with its own 
rules of conduct, causation, and damages); Marjorie Maguire Shultz,  From Informed 
Consent to Patient Choice:  A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 276 (1985) (urging 
adoption of a “new model for the allocation of authority between doctors and 
patients” by “direct creation of an independent interest in medical choice” thereby 
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incipient development under informed consent relates to attempts to 
extend the scope of the duty of disclosure beyond the medical risks 
inherent in the medical procedure to encompass risks peculiar to the 
physician in question.  Although a number of courts have in recent 
years extended the scope of the duty to disclose to encompass a duty 
to disclose alternatives to the contemplated medical procedure159 and 
the risks of refusing the suggested procedure,160 only quite recently 
have courts begun to address the question of whether an attending 
physician must disclose risks peculiar to him. 
Thus far, few cases have addressed the question of the duty to 
disclose risks peculiar to the physician (as opposed to risks inherent 
in the proposed medical procedure).  Most of these cases have 
involved situations in which the physician allegedly suffered from 
physical or mental impairments that might affect his capacity to 
provide medical services161 or from an infectious disease such as 
HIV.162  In addition, several cases have expanded the duty to disclose 
to encompass potentially conflicting financial or research interests 
that may conflict with the patient’s interests and the fiduciary 
responsibilities that the physician owes to protect his patient’s health 
                                                          
“[c]reating direct legal protection for patient autonomy”); Weisbard, supra note 155, 
at 763  (proposing a “new legal cause of action . . . [imposing] an affirmative 
obligation on physicians to facilitate the patient’s exercise of this right to the extent 
reasonably possible,” with damages assessed for “dignitary harms”); cf. Alan Meisel, A 
“Dignitary Tort” as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the law of Informed 
Consent, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988) (recommending that the 
informed consent doctrine be broadly conceived as protecting the patient’s dignitary 
interests); Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at 609, 654-64 (suggesting that “courts 
should identify and value the decision rights of the plaintiff which the defendant 
destroyed by withholding adequate information,” and compensate for their invasion 
rather than focusing exclusively on whether the lack of disclosure was deemed to 
have caused some physical injury). 
 159. DOBBS, supra note 78, at 659 n.9; see FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 324-25 
(summarizing current law as requiring doctors to disclose alternative diagnostic tests 
or treatments).  
 160. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 106, at 324-26.  
 161. See, e.g., Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 35 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the fact that defendant-surgeon suffered from 
Raynaud’s Syndrome affecting the use of his hands relevant to patient’s informed 
consent claim arising from the results of hip replacement surgery). 
 162. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993) (finding that jury 
should have been allowed to consider whether failure of surgeon to disclose HIV-
positive status constituted a breach of duty); Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at 
Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (holding that 
defendant-medical-center properly barred plaintiff from performing surgery and 
imposing a requirement of informed consent because his work posed a “reasonable 
probability of substantial harm” under informed consent principles even if the 
statistical risk of HIV transmission from doctor to patient was small); see also 
Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 396-400 (analyzing three cases addressing a 
physician’s duty to disclose his or her HIV infection status to a patient). 
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and autonomy interests.163  Fewer cases still have involved claims 
based on the patient’s lack of information about his physician’s level 
of experience and training, the context most relevant to the topic of 
residents. 
Of cases that have involved this narrow type of claim, a majority 
have, for one reason or another, declined to extend the scope of the 
duty to disclose that far.164  Thus, for example, in Whiteside v. Lukson,165 
Dr. Lukson, the defendant surgeon performed a laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy on the patient.  Prior to this, he had participated in 
a two-day class on how to perform a cholecystectomy laparoscopically.  
                                                          
 163. The most notable example is the decision of the Supreme Court of California 
in Moore v. Regents of the University of California. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  In Moore, 
plaintiff-patient was suffering from hairy-cell leukemia, treatment for which entailed 
removal of his spleen and withdrawal of extensive amounts of blood and aspiration 
of bone marrow tissue.  793 P.2d at 481.  Plaintiff alleged that his attending physician 
failed to disclose that he had formed the intent and made arrangements to conduct 
research on plaintiff’s cells to develop and exploit financially.  Id.  The court held 
that the duty to obtain informed consent includes the duty to disclose personal 
research or economic interests unrelated to the patient’s health.  Id. at 483.   Cf. Shea 
v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Minnesota law and 
recognizing a claim based on alleged negligent misrepresentation for failure to 
disclose financial incentives under HMO contract that related to referrals to 
specialists). 
 164. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 83 (N.J. 2002) 
(noting “[c]ourts generally have held that claims of lack of informed consent based 
on a failure to disclose professional-background information are without merit,” but 
also recognizing a potential informed consent claim when a doctor allegedly 
affirmatively misstates his professional experience, and declining to decide whether a 
doctor has a duty to disclose); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958-59  (Haw. 1997) 
(relying on a state statute and holding that defendant-physician who was board 
certified as an otolaryngologist (ear, nose, throat specialist), facial surgeon, and 
cosmetic surgeon and who allegedly disfigured the patient during breast 
augmentation surgery, did not have duty to disclose to the patient that he was “not a 
plastic surgeon and that he did not have hospital privileges”); Duttry v. Patterson, 
771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (holding that “evidence of a physician’s personal 
characteristics and experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim” regardless 
of whether the patient inquired about the physician’s experience, but noting by way 
of caveat that its holding “should not . . . be read to stand for the proposition that a 
physician who misleads his patient is immune” and that a plaintiff may have a cause 
of action for misrepresentation where a physician “allegedly provides inaccurate 
information regarding his experience”), modified by 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1303.504 (d)(2) (West 2002) (stating that a physician may be liable under 
informed consent principles if he knowingly misrepresents his “professional 
credentials, training or experience”); Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (stating that, for the purposes of an informed consent claim by a 
patient operated on for papillary carcinoma and alleging that her surgery caused 
hypoparathyroidism and vocal cord paralysis, although the defendant may be 
required to disclose alternative courses of treatment, “different courses of treatment” 
did not include the choice of a more experienced surgeon and a different hospital, 
and that, in any event, plaintiff was required to prove decision causation); Whiteside 
v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “a surgeon’s lack 
of experience in performing a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for 
the purposes of . . . informed consent”). 
 165. 947 P.2d 1263. 
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The class included “hands-on participation in performing the 
procedure on three pigs.”166  When the defendant sought the 
plaintiff’s informed consent for the surgery, the defendant had never 
performed a cholecystectomy using this laparoscopic technique on a 
person and he did not inform the plaintiff of this fact.167  During 
surgery, Dr. Lukson misidentified and consequently damaged the 
plaintiff’s bile duct, with resulting complications.  Even applying the 
“reasonable patient” standard of disclosure, the court held that “a 
surgeon’s lack of experience in performing a particular surgical 
procedure is not a material fact for the purposes of . . . informed 
consent.”168 
A few courts have, however, begun to recognize a duty of disclosure 
that at least in some circumstances may include information about 
the defendant’s level of experience and training.169  The most notable 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 1264. 
 167. Apparently, by the time he performed surgery on the plaintiff, the defendant 
had performed this laparoscopic  procedure on two other patients.  Id. 
 168. Id. at 1265. 
 169. See, e.g., Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Del. 1997) (holding in a 
case in which defendant-surgeon allegedly clipped decedent’s carotid artery instead 
of the aneurysm during surgery on a cerebral aneurysm, with fatal consequences, 
that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony that defendant’s “failure 
to inform his patient of his lack of recent aneurysm surgery . . . fell below the 
applicable standard of care”); infra text accompanying notes 170-173 (discussing 
Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996)); cf. Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 
157, 169-70 (Md. 2000) (holding in a case in which fourth year resident allegedly 
dissected plaintiff’s bile duct instead of the cystic duct during gall bladder surgery, 
that, as a matter of his contractual undertaking, the attending surgeon could be 
subject to potential liability for allegedly breaching his contractual understanding 
with the patient regarding the allocation of tasks between the attending surgeon and 
the resident, but finding that the trial court’s failure to submit the question to the 
jury was harmless error based on jury’s findings of fact); Howard, 800 A.2d at 83 
(recognizing a potential informed consent claim when a doctor allegedly 
affirmatively misstates his professional experience by “significant 
misrepresentations,” but declining to decide whether a doctor has a duty to disclose).  
The Dingle court noted that given the “expanding era of more complex medical 
procedures, group practices, and collaborative efforts among health care 
providers . . . the identity of the persons who will be performing aspects of the 
surgery” and  “who, precisely, will be conducting or superintending the procedure or 
therapy” must be discussed and resolved, at least if raised by the patient.  749 A.2d at 
166. 
In Howard, the plaintiff underwent unsuccessful back surgery leaving plaintiff in a 
quadriplegic state.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant-surgeon had 
misrepresented his experience and credentials by stating that he was board certified 
at a time when he was merely board-eligible, and only became board certified more 
than two years after the plaintiff’s surgery.  Howard, 800 A.2d at 76 n.1.  Plaintiff also 
alleged that the defendant had told him and his wife that he had performed about 
sixty corpectomies in each of the eleven years that he had been performing such 
procedures, whereas the defendant  had performed approximately “‘a couple 
dozen’” during his career.  Id. at 76-77.  The court held that a “significant” or 
“serious” misrepresentation concerning “the quality or extent of a physician’s 
professional experience . . . can be material to the grant of intelligent and informed 
consent.”  Id. at 83.  The court thus expressly extended the scope of informed 
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decision recognizing a potential to disclose this type of physician-
experience information is Johnson v. Kokemoor,170 a decision by the 
highly respected Justice Shirley Abrahamson.  In Johnson, the plaintiff-
patient was stricken with partial (“incomplete”) quadriplegia 
resulting from neurosurgery to clip a large cerebral posterior basilar 
bifurcation aneurysm.  The plaintiff alleged that she was not provided 
with sufficient information about the level of experience of the 
defendant-surgeon in connection with the especially challenging 
nature of surgery for the specific type of cerebral aneurysm involved. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, for the purposes of 
informed consent, that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in admitting evidence regarding the defendant’s lack of 
experience, the difficulty of the proposed surgery, the fact that 
different physicians have “substantially different success rates” with 
the same medical procedure, the comparable risks171 of surgery 
performed by the defendant versus surgery performed at a tertiary 
care facility (in this case, the Mayo Clinic), and evidence that the 
defendant should have advised the plaintiff of the option of 
undergoing surgery at a tertiary care facility.  The court reasoned that 
this type of information fell within the general obligation of 
physicians to disclose “viable alternatives” to the proposed 
treatment.172 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Johnson strove assiduously to 
contain the potential reach of it’s holding, saying that “‘[i]t is a rare 
exception when the vast body of medical literature and expert 
opinion agree that the difference in experience of the surgeon 
performing the operation will impact the risk of morbidity/mortaility 
as was the case here.’”173  The reality remains, however, that there may 
be significant differences in outcomes between residents and more 
                                                          
consent doctrine to cover the alleged misstatements, and noted that “[s]tripped to its 
essentials, plaintiff’s claim is founded on lack of informed consent.”  Id. at 84.  But, 
the court declined to decide whether, under its prudent patient standard, “personal 
credentials and experience” may be a required part of an informed consent 
disclosure, noting that “[o]ur case law never has held that a doctor has a duty to 
detail his background and experience as part of the required informed consent 
disclosure; nor are we called on to decide that question here.”  Id. at 82. 
 170. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). 
 171. The court’s holding here applied at least when “defendant elected to explain 
the risks confronting the plaintiff in statistical terms.”  Id. at 508. 
 172. Id. at 498, 501 n.17 (relying on both case law and statute). 
 173. Id. at 510 (quoting from Brief for Petitioner at 40); see also Prissel v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003 WL 22998133, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2003) (requiring (and not finding in the record) proof that the morbidity and 
mortality rate expected of the defendant-physician when assisted by a physician’s 
assistant was higher than the rate expected of another cardiovascular surgeon when 
assisted by another surgeon). 
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experienced and established specialists.  But, that said, it does not 
follow that taking an informed consent route to address that reality is 
a sensible course.  In fact, it would raise a host of complexities. 
In addition to the mixed reaction of the courts to extending the 
scope of the duty to disclose a physician’s level of experience, there 
would be complications that are inherent in the informed consent 
doctrine.  Would the Johnson holding mean that virtually any surgeon 
within ninety miles of the Mayo Clinic must essentially apprise his 
patients of the option of going to the Mayo Clinic?  In other words, 
where is the stopping point once we start down that informed 
consent road?  Moreover, the fact that residencies are a learning 
continuum that defy statistical generalization, or perhaps any 
meaningful relative generalizations at all, would limit the range of 
experience-based risk information that one could confidently impart.  
What do the “success rates” really tell us?  Might these rates be skewed 
by how one defines “morbidity”?  And, from what period of time is a 
physician’s performance average to be derived? 
And, even more complexity resides here in the physician-specific 
information claims when causation is considered.  At least two core 
causation dimensions are implicated in informed consent cases.174  
First, in what has been termed “decision causation,”175 the failure to 
disclose must have been outcome-determinative to the decision of a 
reasonable person (under the prevailing rule) to undergo the 
procedure.  This means essentially that, had the required information 
been disclosed, a reasonable patient in the plaintiff’s position would 
have chosen a different course of action.176  This causation 
                                                          
 174. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:  The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 121-22 (1976) (outlining the practical obstacles to showing (1) that 
the plaintiff would reasonably have rejected the proposed treatment if informed and 
(2) that the injury would not have occurred if the patient had reasonably made an 
informed choice for an alternative treatment); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, 
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:  An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 407, 438-39 (1980) (comparing the “rarely acknowledged” issue of injury 
causation with the more widely examined issue of decision causation); Aaron D. 
Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent:  Comparing 
Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (defining “decision causation” 
and “injury causation” and noting that decision causation requires the patient to 
prove he would have reasonably declined his doctor’s advice if fully informed even 
though most “reasonable patients generally follow the nonnegligent 
recommendations of their reasonable doctors”). 
 175. Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 174; see also Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at 
617 & n.38, 643; Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9. 
 176. This proof would most likely be governed by a reasonable person test.  See 
DOBBS, supra note 78, at 657 (explaining that the reasonable patient standard is 
“unique to medical informed consent cases” and limits the doctor’s duty of 
disclosure, but has been widely accepted).  Thus, here, plaintiff would have to also 
prove that a reasonable person in his position, if receiving adequate disclosure, 
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component is much easier to satisfy when the omitted information 
relates to risk information tied to the specific treating physician.177 
The problem lies with the second companion causation dimension 
that has been referred to as “injury causation.”178  This causation 
component requires proof not only that the harm suffered by the 
patient was caused by the treatment or therapeutic approach in 
question, but it also contemplates an additional requirement, which 
“concerns whether the patient’s decision to undergo the procedure 
caused any harm in comparison to the choice that otherwise would 
have been made.”179  For present purposes, the plaintiff would 
presumably also have to show that the harm complained of would not 
have materialized had he been adequately informed about the 
relative experience level of his physician because the performance of 
another health care provider whom he would have reasonably chosen 
would have avoided the harmful consequences.180 
                                                          
would have decided differently. 
 177. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 12.  The authors note: 
In these cases, the question is not whether the patient would have consented 
to the procedure in question (as opposed to some other procedure with a 
different risk matrix, or as opposed to the risk of undergoing no procedure 
at all).  Rather, the question is whether the patient would have consented to 
the procedure to be performed by this provider with this provider’s level of 
risk, as opposed to being performed by another provider with that provider’s 
lower level of risk.  Disputes concerning the identity of the provider do not, 
by their nature, necessarily inhabit the same narrow bounds as cases 
concerning the procedure itself.  Rather, decision causation in this context 
can, and often will, be in the realm of “easy” cases. 
Id. 
 178. Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 174, at 438; see also Twerski & Cohen, supra note 
155, at 617 & n.38; Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9. 
 179. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 9; see Meyers v. Epstein, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New York law and analyzing claim alleging that 
surgeon who performed surgery was not the one to whom consent had been given 
under informed consent principles, and holding that damages for the harm from 
complications of the surgery were not recoverable unless plaintiffs “can show that the 
results of the surgery would have been different had it been performed by [a surgeon 
to whom consent was given]”); see also Epstein, supra note 174, at 121.  Epstein 
elaborates: 
The second causal question raised in informed consent cases concerns what 
might have happened to the patient if appropriate disclosures had led him 
to refuse the proposed treatment.  While it might be tempting to hold the 
physician responsible for the harm caused by the treatment, that position is 
quite unsound if it does not take into account the harm that would have 
occurred in any event. 
Id. at 121-22. 
 180. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002) 
(discussing the injury causation dimension of the causation requirement in informed 
consent case arising out of alleged misinformation regarding the surgeon’s 
credentials and experience); Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., No. 02-1729, 2003 
WL 22998133, at *10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the requirement of causation 
in a case based on an alleged failure to disclose physician-specific risk and requiring 
not only decision causation, but also that the plaintiff prove that the morbidity and 
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Presumably, then, the plaintiff having undergone a specific 
medical procedure must not only prove that had he been adequately 
informed about the relative inexperience of the defendant-physician, 
he reasonably181 would have opted to have the procedure performed 
by a different health care provider (perhaps at a different medical 
facility), the plaintiff must also establish that the harm he is 
complaining of was caused by the treatment he actually received and 
that this harm is greater than what he would have suffered had he 
been warned and had he chosen a different health care provider or 
treatment path.  The problem here is that the patient might well have 
suffered the same outcome even at the hands of a more experienced 
healthcare provider. 
As a response to this causation perturbation, Twerski and Cohen 
suggest that the “lost chance doctrines provide a doctrinal umbrella 
for assessing liability.”182  In Johnson, for example, the comparison 
could be made in various ways.  Perhaps the most likely basis would 
compare the usual morbidity and mortality rate of fifteen percent to 
the estimate for one with the “defendant’s relatively limited 
experience” of close to thirty percent.  Then, under a loss of chance 
analysis we might calculate:  thirty minus fifteen equals a loss of a 
fifteen percent chance of avoiding the adverse result. 
                                                          
mortality rate expected for the defendant when assisted by a physician’s assistant was 
higher than the rate expected of  another cardiovascular surgeon when assisted by 
another surgeon, and also that the patient’s injury was a materialization of that 
increased risk).  The court in Howard said: 
[T]o satisfy the damages element in a claim based on a lack of informed 
consent, a plaintiff typically has to show a causal connection between the 
inadequately disclosed risk of the procedure and the injury sustained.  If that 
risk materialized and harmed plaintiff, damages for those injuries are 
awarded.  Here, if successful in his claim based on lack of informed consent, 
plaintiff may receive damages for injuries caused by an inadequately 
disclosed risk of the corpectomy procedure. 
800 A.2d at 85 (citations omitted).  Unfortunately, the court’s language was very 
general and did not detail precisely what the plaintiff must prove to satisfy this 
element.  As such, it failed to address the complex nuances of injury causation in this 
setting.  See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. 
 181. This proof would most likely be governed by a reasonable person test.  See 
DOBBS, supra note 78, at 657 (explaining that the reasonable patient standard is 
“unique to medical informed consent cases” and limits the doctor’s duty of 
disclosure, but has been widely accepted).  Thus, here, plaintiff would also have to 
prove that a reasonable person in his position, if receiving adequate disclosure, 
would have decided to have the procedure performed by a different health care 
provider (perhaps at a different medical facility). 
 182. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 174, at 23.  This also seems to have been what 
Marjorie Schultz had in mind generally when elaborating on her proposal for a new 
model directly creating a new independent interest in medical choice.  Shultz, supra 
note 158, at 287 (contending that “the loss of an uncertain chance of a preferable 
outcome . . . can be valued as a matter of assessing damage”) (citing Joseph H. King, 
Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions 
and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1353 (1981)). 
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Although I am a champion of the principle of the loss of a chance 
doctrine in other contexts,183 that doctrine may not be suitable here 
in the informed consent setting.  First, the statistical comparisons may 
be flawed because the circumstances of individual patients on which 
they are based may not be commensurable.  The statistical sample 
from the experienced-physician cohort may be too small to be 
meaningful or the relevant information may be unavailable.  Also, 
since residencies are a learning continuum, individual statistical 
generalization may not be feasible.  Moreover, the statistics for the 
defendant-resident would be speculative, unscientific, and in any 
event, based upon too small a sample (almost by definition since our 
defendant is inexperienced) to be meaningful.  Second, there would 
also be problems with defining “success rates” and “morbidity,” as 
well as selecting the period of time from which a physician’s 
performance average would be derived.  The definition of success or 
failure may be different for the defendant and the other provider to 
which he is compared.  The definitions for adverse outcomes may be 
too broad, dissimilar, or general to make any comparison 
meaningful. 
The AMA’s own professional opinions have not contributed clear 
direction in this matter.  At one time they provided that “[i]f a 
resident or other physician is to perform the operation under the 
guidance of the surgeon, it is necessary to make a full disclosure of 
this fact to the patient, and this should be evidenced by an 
appropriate statement contained in the consent.”184  Those guidelines 
then added that if the surgeon employed “merely assists the 
resident . . . in performing the operation, it is the resident . . . who 
becomes the operating surgeon . . . [and that] [i]f the patient is not 
informed as to the identity of the operating surgeon, the situation is 
‘ghost surgery.’”185 
However, the current opinion states:  “If a resident or other 
physician is to perform the operation under non-participatory 
supervision, it is necessary to make a full disclosure of this fact to the 
                                                          
 183. For an article associated with the development and judicial acceptance of the 
“loss of a chance” theory in medical malpractice law, see King, supra.  For additional 
elaboration on the conceptual nuances of the loss of a chance doctrine, see Joseph H. 
King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 28 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 491, 546-54 (1998).  See generally Lars Noah, An 
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 
369 (2005) (discussing some of the pitfalls and potential errors in application of the 
doctrine). 
 184. American Medical Association Judicial Council Opinion 8.12 (1982), quoted 
in Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 168 n.3 (Md. 2000). 
 185. American Medical Association Judicial Council Opinion 8.12. 
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patient, and this should be evidenced by an appropriate statement 
contained in the consent.  Under these circumstances, it is the 
resident or other physician who becomes the operating surgeon.”186  
Thus, the change represents deliberate silence by the Judicial 
Council of the AMA on the potential duties of disclosure when a 
resident undertakes to perform medical procedures in the presence 
of the attending physician (since then it would presumably be 
participatory supervision rather than “non-participatory 
supervision”). 
Some commentators have raised the possibility of vindicating the 
patient’s interest in information regarding the physician’s education 
and experience by invoking other theories of liability, such as some 
aspect of a misrepresentation theory.187  The misrepresentation route 
raises a host of complications and is problematic.  In the first place, 
the “misrepresentation” or “fraud” moniker may mean different 
things depending on the eye of the beholder.  It might, for instance, 
be invoked not as a discrete theory of liability, but rather as a means 
of attempting to invalidate a patient’s consent in order to support a 
claim by the patient for battery.188  Or, misrepresentation might be 
asserted as a freestanding theory of liability.189  Adding to the 
confusion, some commentators seem to meld the two ideas, battery 
                                                          
 186. Substitution of Surgeon without Patient’s Knowledge or Consent, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.16 (1994), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html (follow “Accept” hyperlink; then 
follow “Code of Medical Ethics” hyperlink; then follow “E-8.00 Opinions on Practice 
Matters” hyperlink; then follow “E-8.16 Substitution of Surgeon without Patient’s 
Knowledge or Consent” hyperlink). 
 187. See Heyward H. Bouknight, III, Note, Between the Scalpel and the Lie:  Comparing 
Theories of Physician Accountability for Misrepresentations of Experience and Competence, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1560 (2003) (recommending a misrepresentation-based 
“fraud” cause of action premised upon a “legally enforceable expectation” that a 
physician will reply honestly to a patient “who specifically inquires about his doctor’s 
experience”).  One court has noted the multifarious legal theories that might be 
invoked, at least when an attending physician allegedly fails to abide by an 
understanding regarding the allocation of responsibilities between attending 
physicians and residents.  See Dingle, 749 A.2d at 170.  The Dingle court stated: 
The lack of a clear understanding prior to the procedure may well engender 
a later finding that informed consent was not obtained.  A violation of an 
understanding so reached may constitute the lack of informed consent, 
negligent delegation, and a breach of the contract, not to mention the risk 
of a claim of misrepresentation or fraud.  It would be prudent, of course, for 
the written consent form presented to the patient either to set forth any 
special understanding in this regard or note affirmatively that there is no 
such understanding. 
Id. 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (clarifying that 
consent induced by a substantial mistake resulting from misrepresentation is not 
effective consent for the unanticipated invasion or harm). 
 189. See Bouknight, supra note 187, at 1545. 
KING.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  3:08:07 PM 
2006] THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR RESIDENTS 729 
and misrepresentation.190  The misrepresentation characterization, as 
either a prong of a battery claim or a freestanding misrepresentation 
cause of action, seems a singularly blunt instrument with which to 
address the matter of nondisclosures by medical residents. 
A battery characterization or allegation may raise a number of 
complications.  That route would present the question of whether 
such claims should nonetheless be governed exclusively by the 
informed consent doctrine irrespective of attempts to characterize it 
as a battery.191  That in turn could depend on whether a resident 
merely failed to disclose or misstated his experience and background, 
or more seriously, failed to reveal or misstated his involvement in the 
patient’s surgery or other treatment.192  The Restatement provides 
that consent may be invalidated by a mistake “concerning the nature 
of the invasion . . . or the extent of the harm to be expected”193 if that 
mistake is known to the defendant or is induced by the defendant’s 
misrepresentation.  A key question would presumably be whether the 
defendant either knew of the patient’s “mistake,” or induced it.  
                                                          
 190. See id. (referring in the same paragraph to fraudulent misrepresentation as a 
“stand-alone tort” and allowing the plaintiff “to bring an action for battery”). 
 191. Cf. supra note 179 (discussing Meyers v. Epstein, 282 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).  But, the same judge in an earlier opinion in the same case said 
that “informed consent cases are inapposite.”  Meyers v. Epstein, 232 F. Supp. 2d 192, 
196 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 192. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 81 (N.J. 2002); 
Bundrick v. Stewart, 114 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see also infra note 
195 (discussing the Meyers opinions).  In Howard, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
rejected a battery characterization where the defendant-surgeon had allegedly 
misstated the level of his specialty board certification and the number of times he 
had performed corpectomies.  In doing so, the court distinguished this situation 
from a true “ghost surgery” situation in which a different physician performs the 
surgery than the one to whom the patient specifically consented and contemplated 
would perform it.  800 A.2d at 81.  The court specifically noted that a battery claim 
might lie “where there has been ‘ghost surgery’ or where no consent has been given 
for the procedure undertaken.”  Id. 
In Bundrick, the patient suffered a massive infection resulting from improper 
suture placement during an attempt to repair the mesentery lining of her bowel 
during tubal reanastomosis surgery.  She alleged, inter alia, that a medical battery 
had occurred based on the allegation that a third-year resident participated in the 
surgery without her consent.  The court implied that the resident might have owed a 
duty to the patient to disclose the fact that he would be participating in the plaintiff’s 
surgery, saying that the resident “had no right to participate without [the patient’s] 
consent.”  114 P.2d at 1209.  The court, however, went on to affirm the judgment 
against the plaintiff on the medical battery claim, relying on the “broad” consent 
signed by the patient consenting to “all medical treatment or . . . services performed or 
prescribed by/or at the direction of the attending physician,” as sufficient.  Id. (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added).  The jury had been instructed that “[a] patient may 
refuse to consent to a particular doctor . . . [and a] health care provider has a duty to 
honor such a refusal of consent if the patient has informed the health care provider 
of the refusal.”  Id. (citation ommitted).  The jury then found that the patient did not 
refuse consent to the participation of the resident.  Id. 
 193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979). 
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Furthermore, the courts would have to decide whether mere silence 
constituted misrepresentation, which in turn might ultimately entail 
deciding the fundamental question of whether or when a resident 
owed a duty to disclose such information to the patient.  The 
apparent perceived overlap between misrepresentation, or at least 
negligent misrepresentation, and informed consent further clouds 
the analysis.194 
Likewise, invoking a freestanding misrepresentation theory would 
involve its own parade of entanglements.195  Should a distinction be 
drawn based on whether a defendant-resident affirmatively misstated 
his experience or merely failed to disclose it?196  And, if the physician 
merely failed to disclose information about his credentials, training, 
or experience, the outcome would depend in part on whether the 
court imposed a duty to disclose under the circumstances.197  
Moreover, proof of reliance would most certainly be required.198  
                                                          
 194. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 504 n.29 (Wis. 1996) (noting that 
an overlap exists between negligent misrepresentation and informed consent, and 
that “allegations made and evidence introduced by the plaintiff might have fit 
comfortably under either theory”). 
 195. See, e.g., Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 196-201 (discussing the complex torts, 
damages, causation, and proximate causation aspects of malpractice and fraud claims 
against a surgeon to whom consent had been given, and a battery claim against 
another surgeon who allegedly performed the surgery); Meyers, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 
155 (analyzing a claim alleging that surgeon who performed surgery was not the one 
to whom consent had been given under informed consent principles and holding 
that damages for harm from the complications of the surgery were not recoverable 
unless plaintiffs “can show that the results of the surgery would have been different 
had it been performed by [surgeon to whom consent was given]”).  The court had 
initially allowed the malpractice claim against the surgeon and the battery claim 
against the resident surgeon who allegedly performed the surgery to proceed.  See 
Meyers, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 199-201. 
 196. The complex issue of whether or when there is a duty to disclose in the 
context of fraudulent misrepresentation claims for pecuniary losses unrelated to 
personal injury is addressed in the Restatement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 551 (1977).  The sheer uncertainty of it all is especially evident in section 
551(e) (assigning a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose facts to the other 
party before the transaction is consummated, including “facts basic to the 
transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to 
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of 
the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of 
those facts”). 
 197. See Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 959 (Haw. 1997) (holding that an 
instruction to the jury on fraud was erroneous because that defendant-physician who 
was board certified as otolaryngologist, facial surgeon, and cosmetic surgeon and 
who allegedly disfigured the plaintiff in breast augmentation surgery, did not have 
duty to disclose to the patient that he was “not a plastic surgeon and that he did not 
have hospital privileges”). 
 198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965) (dealing with liability for 
conscious misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm); RESTATEMENT  
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) (dealing with liability for negligent 
misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm); § 546 (dealing with the 
causation requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in exclusively 
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Little wonder, then, that a majority of the few cases to consider the 
question have resisted using the misrepresentation theory to remedy 
the problem of inadequate patient information regarding a 
physician’s education, training, and experience.199 
Occasionally, a case will even invoke breach of contract as a 
possible theory of liability.  For example, in one case, a fourth-year 
resident dissected a patient’s bile duct instead of the cystic duct 
during a gall bladder surgery.200  The court held that an attending 
surgeon could potentially be liable for allegedly breaching his 
contractual understanding with the patient regarding the allocation 
of tasks during surgery between the attending surgeon and the 
resident.201 
                                                          
pecuniary loss unrelated to personal injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 
(1977) (dealing with reliance requirement for negligent misrepresentation resulting 
in exclusively pecuniary loss unrelated to personal injury).  For discussion of the four 
dimensions of reliance generally, see Joseph H. King, Limiting the Vicarious Liability of 
Franchisors for the Torts of their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 444-45, 448-60 
(2005) (discussing the reliance requirement for apparent agency for the purposes of 
vicarious liability). 
 199. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 82 (N.J. 2002) 
(citing cases that have rejected a claim of fraud cause of action where physicians 
allegedly misrepresent or fail to disclose background credentials).  The Howard court 
followed the reasoning of these cases and held that even allegations that the 
defendant surgeon affirmatively misrepresented his credentials and experience 
could not be pursued as a fraud or deceit-based claim.  Id.  In rejecting such a fraud 
claim under the circumstances, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that not 
only might such an approach increase the possibility of an award of punitive 
damages, but the court also suggested its discomfort with fraud claims arising solely 
from the physician-patient relationship.  Id.  The court did, however, expressly 
extend the scope of the informed consent doctrine to cover these misstatements and 
noted that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially founded on lack of informed consent.  
Id. at 84; see also Ditto, 947 P.2d at 959 (holding that since defendant-physician who 
allegedly disfigured the plaintiff during breast augmentation surgery did not have a 
duty to disclose to the patient that he was not a certified plastic surgeon and did not 
have hospital privileges, instructing the jury on fraud was erroneous); Paulos v. 
Johnson, 597 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that where a plaintiff 
claimed that he was erroneously advised that the defendant-physician was a board-
certified plastic surgeon, that a fraudulent misrepresentation claim could not lie). 
Notably, at least one case has held that wheras an informed consent cause of 
action is not available, a claim for misrepresentation might be available  if a physician 
provides inaccurate information about his experience and training prior to 
performing a medical procedure.  See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 
2001) (holding that “evidence of a physician’s personal characteristics and 
experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim” but stressing that the court’s 
holding “should not . . . be read to stand for the proposition that a physician who 
misleads a patient is immune from suit,” because a plaintiff may have a cause of 
action for misrepresentation where a physician “allededly provides inaccurate 
information regarding his experience”), modified by 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1303.504(d)(2) (West 2002) (stating that a physician may be liable under informed 
consent principles for knowingly misrepresenting his professional credentials, 
training or experience). 
 200. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 159 (Md. 2000).  
 201. Id. at 169-70 (finding, however, that a breach of contract claim could not 
survive because an issue that was central to the plaintiff’s contract claim was 
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Even if a new theory of liability were created to sidestep the 
causation-of-physical-harm hurdles202 or to augment the traditional 
informed consent doctrine,203 such an approach would be 
problematic.  The courts would still have to grapple with the problem 
of how to value any new interest independent of the physical 
dimension of the treatment.  This is the soft spot in proposals to 
create a new dignitary theory of liability to supplement the traditional 
informed consent remedy. 
For example, Shultz, Twerski, and Cohen, who were early 
proponents for recognizing a brand-new autonomy interest in 
information necessary for informed medical decisionmaking,204 seem 
vague on precisely how damages for invasions of the proposed 
dignitary interest would be valued.  Shultz writes: 
Identification of an intangible interest in choice could also allow 
recovery for less traditional categories of harm.  Courts could 
evaluate consequences of a substantial but not necessarily 
“physical” or “injurious” (as socially judged) harm . . . .  For 
example, although emotional distress damages would constitute a 
particularly likely result of invasions of this interest, courts could 
restrict such recoveries.205 
We are not told, however, precisely how the courts are to limit 
recoveries.  Similarly, Twerski and Cohen state: 
Not all choice deprivations are of equal magnitude.  When valuing 
the denial to the plaintiff of his right to exercise options, one must 
consider the range of options available and their possible benefits 
and detriments.  The greater the range of benefits available 
through alternate choice, the greater the harm done to the choice-
making process . . . .  Once more, the focus on the undesirable 
result rather than on the uninformed nature of the decision-
making process has diverted attention from the actual damages 
that flow from a crippled decision-making process.206 
                                                          
submitted to the jury at trial, where the jury found in the defendant’s favor). 
 202. See supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text (addressing the challenge that 
results for plaintiffs in meeting the dual-causation standard, particularly the “injury 
causation” prong). 
 203. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (exploring the theory proposed by 
various scholars that the informed consent doctrine either be broadly conceived to 
protect the patient’s dignitary interests or be replaced by a tort that would protect 
the patient’s right to autonomous decisionmaking). 
 204. See supra note 158. 
 205. Shultz, supra note 158, at 290 (citations omitted). 
 206. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 155, at 658-59; see Weisbard, supra note 155, at 
763 (suggesting that damages for dignitary harms should be based on a statutory 
schedule ranging from $1,000 to $10,000, perhaps allowing for greater recovery for 
punitive damages in unusual circumstances). 
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We are left with sparse guidance as to how such dignitary interests are 
to be measured.  Then, we would face the ethereal labor of 
attempting to convert the non-economic effects of a perceived 
invasion of a patient’s autonomy or dignitary interests into money 
(read damages), despite the fact that the two are incommensurable.207 
I prefer not to attempt to force the problem of resident-based 
medical errors into an informed consent/loss-of-chance vessel or into 
a newly minted but undefined freestanding autonomy cause of 
action.  A more sensible approach would be to meld a duty to disclose 
one’s resident status with the standard of care rule used to evaluate 
the defendant’s overall performance of the medical procedure.  That 
approach is discussed in the following section. 
III. THESIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Proposed Standard of Care Rule 
Rather than address the problem of treatment by medical residents 
exclusively through either the standard of care or the doctrine of 
informed consent (or some other information-based theory of 
liability), I propose the following  more elegant solution that melds 
the two doctrines:  When medical residents (both not-yet-licensed 
and licensed ones) fully disclose their status, including their 
experience, training, education, and credentials,  to their patients, 
then their performance should be judged by a standard of care 
commensurate with their actual level of post-graduate medical 
training, education, and experience.  Licensed residents should, in 
addition and as a minimum, be held to the standard of a licensed 
general practitioner.  A resident (either licensed or not-yet-fully-
licensed) who either affirmatively misstates or fails to disclose his 
status will not be permitted to avail himself of the standard 
commensurate with his limited experience and training.  If such 
resident affirmatively misrepresents his credentials and experience, 
then he should at least be held to the standard commensurate with 
the professional background that he claims to possess. 
Now for the tough part.  When a resident fails to disclose, I 
propose the following approach:  When a resident fails to disclose his 
status, not-yet-fully-licensed residents should be held to the standard 
                                                          
 207. I have addressed this problem more broadly in another publication.  See 
Joseph H. King, Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 
SMU L. REV. 163 (2004) (suggesting that damages for pain and suffering should not 
be recoverable in personal injury tort claims, with the trade-off that the scope of 
economic damages and attorney’s fees be broadly conceived). 
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of care expected of a fully licensed physician who has completed his 
internship.  A non-disclosing licensed resident, actively participating 
in a graduate medical program to prepare him for a medical 
specialty, should be held to the standard of the specialty covered by 
his residency program when serving n the capacity of a specialist, 
unless he can prove that the patient’s reasonable expectations were 
of some less demanding standard, in which case he will be held to a 
standard commensurate with those expectations.  As a practical 
matter, then, a non-disclosing licensed resident would usually be held 
to the specialty of his residency program when he is serving in the 
role of a specialist or in the scope of that specialty.  For example, a 
non-disclosing surgical resident would be held to the standard of care 
of a specialist-surgeon when performing surgery or managing a post-
operative patient’s care.  On the other hand, that same resident may 
not be held to the specialist-surgeon standard when helping to 
conduct physical exams that the hospital offered to the local high 
schools as a public service. 
Thus far, I have been addressing the conduct of medical residents 
while actively engaged within the scope of their duties in their 
graduate medical-education residency programs.  Residents 
sometimes moonlight208 at hospital emergency rooms and elsewhere, 
and may be functioning outside of the scope of their formal 
residency-training program.  I would also apply my suggested rule in 
this scenario as well.    Therefore, in the absence of disclosure to the 
patient of their residency status, it would have to be decided whether 
such moonlighting residents were serving in a generalist or in a 
specialist capacity (unless the resident could show that the patient’s 
reasonable expectations were of some less demanding standard).209 
Under the preceding proposal, alleged malpractice against a 
medical resident would proceed as a traditional claim for negligent 
performance of professional medical services.  That being so, the 
burden of proof would be on the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant-resident violated the standard of care—as defined in 
accordance with the proposed rule—and if so, to prove the harm 
caused by that alleged substandard care. 
                                                          
 208. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of 
moonlighting among residents and the substantial criticism that accompanies this 
practice). 
 209. See generally Keim & Chisholm, supra note 22, at 927 (declaring that “[w]e 
believe patients who are cared for by a moonlighting physician have the right to 
expect that their physician practices according to the standard of care for EM 
[Emergency Medicine],” adding that “[m]oonlighting weakens the fabric of our 
profession, and continues to propagate the myth that ‘anyone can work in an ER’”). 
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The confusing state of the law regarding the standard of care for 
residents has inspired a number of suggestions by others for reform.  
These typically address the matter exclusively through the standard of 
care,210 through manipulation of the doctrine of informed consent,211 
or by the use of some other theory of liability, such as 
misrepresentation.212  In general, I do not believe such proposals 
strike a suitable balance between competing interests, nor are they 
sufficiently predictable in their operation.213 
B.  Rationale 
In addressing the standard of care for residents, we must confront 
the contending interests and the difficult underlying ethical dilemma 
                                                          
 210. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 40, at 492 (stating that residents “should be held 
to a progressively higher standard as their knowledge, experience, and practice 
progressively increase through their residency training”).  Reuter goes on to say that 
“[f]irst-year residents should be held to the standard of practice of a generalist[,] . . . 
final-year residents should be held to the standard of a specialist[,] . . . and [h]ouse 
staff in the middle of their training period should be held to an intermediate 
standard.”  Id.  I believe, however, that residents should not be permitted to avail 
themselves of the sliding scale standard of care unless they have fully disclosed their 
status and level of education and experience to their patients.  See also Ward, supra 
note 28, at 295-96 (suggesting a two-step approach to determine the appropriate 
standard of case for residents).  If a resident held himself out as a specialist, Ward 
advocates that the court hold the resident to the same standard of care as a specialist 
in the field in which the resident was practicing.  Id. at 296.  But, if the court 
determined that the resident did not hold himself out as a specialist, it should “move 
to step two to determine if the procedure in question is ordinarily performed only by 
specialists.”  Id.  Further, “[i]f the procedure in question is usually undertaken only 
by specialists, then the court would hold the resident to the same standard as a 
specialist.”  Id. 
  The Ward proposal suffers from several shortcomings.  First, it depends initially on 
a determination of whether a resident held himself out as a specialist.  But what if a 
resident says nothing?  When will a resident be deemed to have held himself out?  I 
prefer a rule that places an incentive on the resident to disclose affirmatively his 
status and background, which ideally would foster a dialogue with the patient if the 
resident’s background is important to the patient.  Moreover, under Ward’s 
proposal, residents who hold themselves out as specialists would automatically be 
held to that standard.  I prefer affording residents who fully disclose their status the 
benefit of a sliding scale standard expected of a person with a similar level of post-
graduate professional education, training, and experience. 
Under Ward’s proposal, if a defendant did not hold himself out as a specialist, then 
he would be held to the standards of a general practitioner unless he performed a 
procedure that is usually undertaken only by specialists.  But whether a procedure is 
usually undertaken only by specialists would be difficult to determine.  Also, what is 
meant by “specialist”—only those who are board certified?  Board eligible?  There 
might also be a question of which specialty the resident should be considered under 
because sometimes multiple specialties undertake the same medical procedure.  This 
approach leaves many questions and ambiguities. 
 211. Supra notes 158, 182 and accompanying text. 
 212. Supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 213. For a more detailed assessment, see supra note 210 (addressing standard of 
care proposals); supra notes 173-183 (discussing an informed consent approach); 
supra notes 187-197 (analyzing a variety of misrepresentation proposals). 
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that they create.  On the one hand, we have the individual patients 
whose safety, health, and rights to self-determination are at stake.  
Medicine, like any professional activity, improves with experience.  In 
fact, Professors Twerski and Cohen tell us that for all medical 
procedures studied, the data consistently show an inverse relationship 
between the number of procedures performed per provider and the 
rates of unfavorable outcomes, as measured by risk-adjusted mortality 
or complication rates and thus suggest that “‘practice makes 
proficiency.’”214  Accordingly, “[a]ny contention that a reasonable 
patient would consider his or her physician’s level of experience 
immaterial to a procedure, particularly an invasive procedure, is 
clearly contradicted by real life experiences.”215  But the health of us 
all depends on the education, training, and experience of residents 
so that they may assume their crucial roles among the most qualified 
medical specialists in the world.216  And it is essential that the 
individual resident gains needed experience.217  Thus, the immediate 
microcosmic interests of individual patients may be arrayed against 
                                                          
 214. Twerski and Cohen, supra note 174, at 13 n.30 (quoting Don Colburn, 
Practice Makes Proficiency in Bypass Surgery, Study Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1997, at 
WH-5). 
 215. Iheukwumere, supra note 153, at 413-14; see Gregory L. Larkin et al., Great 
Expectations:  Patient/Customer Preferences for Resident Physicians (RPs) & Physician 
Extenders (PEs) in the Emergency Department (ED), 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 384a 
[Abstract],  (1999) (reporting that 65.3% of emergency room patients want to know 
the level of training of the health-care providers that are caring for them). 
At least one state has addressed the patient’s disclosure interests by statute.  See VA. 
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2961(E) (2003).  This statute requires that the Board of Medicine 
adopt guidelines providing for: 
[T]he obtaining of informed consent from all patients or from the next of 
kin or legally authorized representative, to the extent practical under the 
circumstances . . . after such patients or other persons have been informed as 
to which physicians, residents, or interns will perform the surgery or other 
invasive procedure. 
Id.  The statute mentions that the guidelines should also include: 
[P]olicies to avoid situations, unless the circumstances fall within an 
exception in the Board’s guidelines or the policies of the relevant hospital, 
medical school or other organization operating the graduate medical 
education program, in which a surgeon, intern or resident represents that he 
will perform a surgery or other invasive procedure that he then fails to 
perform. 
Id. 
 216. The courts have acknowledged the importance of this interest.  See, e.g., 
Owens v. Thomae, 904 So. 2d 207, 210 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that established 
physicians engaged in the training of residents are fulfilling the state’s strong interest 
in educating medical students, interns, and residents that will be society’s future 
doctors). 
 217. See Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) 
(commenting that the intern’s primary reward is the practical medical and surgical 
instruction that he gains from assisting or watching the more experienced physicians 
treat a spectrum of  patient and illnesses). 
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the longer term macrocosmic ones; namely the education of the 
medical profession.218 
In the individual patient we hear the echo of that Kantian 
admonition—we must not treat any person as a means, but rather 
always as ends.219  Thus, Kant’s classic construct states:  “Act in such a 
way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end.”220  He refers to the autonomy of the will “as the 
supreme principle of morality.”221  But, as Professor Daniel Markovits 
reminds us, Kant’s “categorical imperative” contains two distinct 
commands concerning how to treat humanity.222  Markovits explains: 
 The principle that one should never use persons merely as 
means prohibits actions that follow principles or rules . . . that 
could not possibly be accepted by the persons whom the actions 
affect.  The principle that one should always treat other persons as 
ends in themselves prohibits actions in pursuit of ends that the 
persons whom they affect cannot share . . . .  The first command—
about not using persons merely as means—captures the idea that 
persons are not simply available to one another.  Unlike things, 
persons have independent intellects and wills . . . concerning the 
world and their places in it.  A person who acts against others based 
on a maxim that they cannot accept in effect denies this:  She 
bypasses their . . . intellects and their wills . . . and so treats them 
not as persons but merely as things. 
 The second command—about treating persons as ends in 
themselves—captures the idea that even though persons are not 
simply available to one another, they must nevertheless be open to 
one another . . . .  A person who acts against others in pursuit of 
ends that they cannot share, even if she responds to their wills in 
one way, does so on terms that necessarily set her apart from them 
                                                          
 218. There may also be are other conflicts here.  See, e.g., Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 
157, 169-70 (Md. 2000).  The court asserted: 
The parties may well have conflicting interests in that regard—the doctor 
wanting as much flexibility and discretion as possible and the patient, if 
choosing the physician because of some special confidence in that 
physician’s particular abilities, desiring that the selected physician oversee 
and personally perform the most difficult part of the procedure. 
Id. 
 219. See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 16 (2005) 
(discussing that this Kantian principle has been of great significance to the field of 
bioethics, highlighting autonomy as a governing principle in the field). 
 220. IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW:  KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC 
OF MORALS 91 (H.J. Paton trans., Hutchinson Univ. Library 1967) (1785).   
 221. Id. at 101. 
 222. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1424 
(2004) (explaining that humanity has been defined by Kant as the capacity to 
determine ends through rational choice). 
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and therefore that rule out joint participation in the acts in 
question. 
 Someone who violates these two commands refuses to engage 
others as persons, in the first case by declining to address them at 
all and in the second case by addressing them on terms that they 
cannot accept.  And in refusing to engage them, she estranges 
herself from them and renders shared participation in a respectful 
relation—at least in connection with the actions in question—quite 
literally impossible.223 
Kant’s two commands anticipate the essence of our dilemma:  in 
one sense medical care administered by a resident is a learning 
experience and thus does treat the patient as a means to educate the 
resident.  On the other hand, the patients—all patients—may share 
in the “end” of benefiting from highly trained physicians and medical 
specialists.  Dilemmas like this are not unique; indeed, they are 
inherent in the life of the law.224  It has always been easier to accept 
casualties if we did not have to face them.225  Dr. Gawande captured 
the sober reality of this dilemma during his residency, reflecting on 
his own child’s hospitalization: 
In a sense, then, the physician’s dodge is inevitable.  Learning must 
be stolen, taken as a kind of bodily eminent domain.  And it was, 
during Walker’s stay—on many occasions, now that I think back on 
it.  A resident intubated him.  A surgical trainee scrubbed in for his 
operation.  The cardiology fellow put in one of his central lines.  
None of them asked me if they could.  If offered the option to have 
someone more experienced, I certainly would have taken it.  But 
that was simply how the system worked—no such choices were 
offered—and so I went along.  What else could I do?226 
Practice by residents is thus portrayed as a matter of pedagogical, 
utilitarian expediency.  But, although this “coldhearted 
machinery . . . gets the learning done,”227 it does not exact its 
educational costs equally.  Dr. Gawande comments: 
                                                          
 223. Id. at 1425-26. 
 224. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) 
(articulating that the “threshold question” in a nuisance case involving air pollution 
was “whether the court should resolve the litigation between the parties . . . or 
whether, seeking promotion of the general public welfare, it should channel private 
litigation into public societal objectives”). 
 225. Cf. Jennifer Hewett, Mesmerising, Until the Dead Stare Back, SIDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Mar. 27, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/26/ 
1048653747489.html (noticing that the stark realities of death in the Iraqi war 
become much more tangible and difficult to accept when the public is able to 
continuously view such violence in the media).   
 226. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 32. 
 227. Id. 
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If learning is necessary but causes harm, then above all it ought to 
apply to everyone alike.  Given a choice, people wriggle out, and 
those choices are not offered equally.  They belong to the 
connected and the knowledgeable, to insiders over outsiders, to the 
doctor’s child but not the truck driver’s.  If choice cannot go to 
everyone, maybe it is better when it is not allowed at all.228 
Reconciling Kant’s commands—if they can be reconciled at all—
requires some effort to facilitate disclosure to patients of the status 
and background of their treating residents.229 
Both patient and resident may invoke fairness arguments.  Patients 
may claim that they deserve treatment by experienced practitioners 
and should not be unwitting guinea pigs.  Residents may argue that it 
is unfair to hold them to a standard expected of established 
practitioners and specialists when they are still very much in a 
formative, learning mode.  Courts have had to face this kind of 
fairness issue before in deciding standard of care questions. 
A similar standard of care problem exists with respect to children.  
Competing arguments exist there too; children may claim that it is 
unfair to hold them to an adult standard, and victims may argue that 
they deserve protection when children are engaging in adult 
behavior.  The law’s response has been a compromise.  In general, 
minor children are held to the standard of care expected of other 
children of like age, intelligence, and experience.230  But there is an 
exception when the child who causes injury was engaging in an adult 
activity.231  One rationale for the adult-activity exception is instructive 
for our purposes.  It is based on the likelihood that a potential victim 
will be on notice as to the status of the child.  When actors are 
engaged in adult activities, potential victims may expect that adults 
will be the relevant actors, and the law vindicates that expectation by 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 32-33; see also Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care:  
Lessons from Medical Consumerism and Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability 
Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 151 (1994) (noting that many hospitals 
undermine patient interests and deprive them of their autonomy by neglecting to 
inform them that medical students will be examining them or that residents and 
interns will perform their surgical procedures while being only supervised by a 
licensed physician). 
 229. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 106, 124 (1996) (analyzing that when Kant speaks of rational 
nature or humanity is an end in itself, he is referring to the human power of rational 
choice). 
 230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10(a) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005); DOBBS, supra note 78, at 293. 
 231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 10(c) 
(stating that a child is held to an adult standard of care when engaging in any 
dangerous activity that would characteristically be undertaken by adults). 
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holding such actors, even if children, to the higher adult standard of 
care.232 
This analogy is useful for our purposes.  If patients lack notice of 
the true status and relative inexperience of the treating resident, as 
many patients often do,233 then the application of a higher standard 
of care becomes more justified.234  Hopefully, my disclosure-based 
standard of care rule could ultimately motivate more vigorous 
promotion or enforcement of work-hour guidelines, more consistent 
and transparent supervision of residents, and more clearly delineated 
lines of responsibility between residents and attending or supervising 
physicians. 
My proposal also offers a predictable rule.  Although the proposed 
rule is grounded on respect for the collective expectations of patients 
generally, it does not (apart from one limited exception for specialty-
                                                          
 232. See DOBBS, supra note 78, at 301 (stating that “when the older minor creates 
risk to others who cannot identify the actor as a minor or protect themselves, the 
adult standard seems the most appropriate one for protecting the reasonable 
expectations of the other party”); see also David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations 
and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law:  The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the 
Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 46 (1981) (concluding that in cases 
where it is unclear whether a minor should be judged by an adult or a child standard 
of care, that courts should take into account the reasonable expectations of the other 
party dealing with the minor).  Seidelson continues by adding that where the other 
party contemplates that the minor is displaying a level of knowledge, skill, or 
maturity below that of an adult, that the minor should receive the benefit of being 
judged according to the child standard of care.  Id.; cf. Ritchie-Gamester v. City of 
Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Mich. 1999) (adopting a recklessness standard for 
coparticipants in recreational activities and reasoning that this standard most 
accurately reflects the actual expectations of participants in recreational activities 
that carry a risk of inadvertent harm, known to the party at the outset). 
 233. See GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining that very few people have the 
medical knowledge that would even enable them to ask the right questions and 
determine the level of experience possessed by each person who is participating in 
their treatment).    One poll conducted by the National Sleep Foundation found that 
eighty-six percent of respondents indicated that they would feel anxious about their 
safety if they learned that the doctor that will be performing their surgery had been 
on duty for twenty-four consecutive hours, but seventy percent reported that they 
would request another doctor and sixty percent would be unlikely to assume that the 
procedure would go “well.”  NAT’L SLEEP FOUND., 2002 SLEEP IN AMERICA POLL 26 
(2002), available at http://www.sleepfoundation.org/content/hottopics/2002SleepI 
nAmericaPoll.pdf.  What would the public’s response be if asked to consider their 
reaction if they were told that their doctor was only a resident? 
 234. See Seidelson, supra note 232, at 25 n.34.  Seidelson argues: 
[T]he basic reason for imposing a professional standard on one who engages 
in a professional activity is the anticipation of the other party that the 
‘professional’ is what he purports to be.  When that anticipation does not 
reasonably exist and the actor is in fact not a professional, for example, when 
‘Aunt Minnie’ suggests a home remedy to her nephew - the court is unlikely 
to impose the professional standard on the actor.  Similarly, it seems to me, 
when the actor’s minority is known, actually or constructively, to the other 
party, giving the minor the benefit of the child standard will do no violence 
to the reasonable expectations of the other party. 
Id. 
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oriented residents) demand a case-by-case inquiry of individual 
expectations.  Rather, it focuses on the presence, or absence, of 
disclosure to the individual patient.  Hence, under the rule that I 
propose, the standard of care does not vary according to the 
expectations of the patient.235  The proposed approach offers a 
bright-line rule for deciding whether a resident’s conduct is to be 
evaluated by an experience-based standard or a more demanding 
standard.  Under my test, the question of the applicable standard of 
care would be determined by the presence or absence of actual 
disclosure to the patient, unless the defendant can prove the patient’s 
reasonable expectations were of some less demanding standard.236 
By fostering disclosures, my rule is consistent with the fiduciary 
obligation owed to patients by their treating physicians.  Although the 
physician-patient relationship has been characterized by a number of 
metaphors,237 the dominant metaphor is that of a fiduciary 
relationship.238  In general,  “[t]he law has imposed obligations on 
                                                          
 235. Cf. Caroline Forell, Reassessing the Negligence Standard of Care for Minors, 15 
N.M. L. REV. 485 (1985).  In connection with the standard of care for children, 
Professor Forrell rejects tying the application of the “adult activity” exception to a 
test based on the reasonable expectations of the victim.  She reasons: 
Even if a uniform reasonable expectations test were adopted, such a test 
would require a case-by-case determination of whether the plaintiff knew or 
should have known that the defendant was a minor.  There would be no 
certainty as to which standard applied to any category of activities . . . . The 
unpredictability of such a test would probably only make this area even more 
murky and analytically dissatisfying. 
Id. at 502 n.98.  As to which standard of care applies to children, Forell would base 
her rule on a distinction between dangerous and carefree activities, which she says 
would be founded on a “fairness” rationale.  Id. at 506-08. 
 236. Cf. Zaverl v. Hanley, 64 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2003) (describing that the alleged 
negligence of the patient’s surgeon resulted in the death of the patient during 
surgery).  The defendant-surgeon argued that he should be held merely to the 
standard of a general surgeon, rather than to the standard of a thoracic or vascular 
surgeon.  Id. at 817.  The court held that the surgeon could be held to the higher 
standard even if he had not led the patient to have an actual expectation that he 
would exercise a greater level of skill, as long as he took affirmative steps to hold 
himself out to the public as such a specialist.  Id.  Although the court found error in 
the jury instructions, the error was deemed harmless.  Id. at 817-18. 
 237. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor:  Divided Physician Loyalties 
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242 (1995).  
Rodwin identified various metaphors for the patient-physician relationship: 
[P]arent-child relations (paternalism); seller-purchaser transactions 
(consumerism); teacher-student learning (education); relations among 
partners or friends (partnership or friendship); or rational parties entering 
into negotiations or contracts (negotiation or rational contract).  Doctors 
have also been viewed both as priestly healers and engineers. 
Id. at 241. 
 238. See id. at 242; see also Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue:  The Landscape of Health 
Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 51 (1993) (observing 
that medical patients are vulnerable and that such vulnerability imposes a fiduciary 
obligation on physicians that is justified by the physician’s dominant position in the 
physician-patient relationship).  Although Professor Rodwin has also referred to 
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physicians, often when they have done something to create reliance 
or a generalized sense of security.”239  I invoke this fiduciary duty not 
as a basis for a new standalone cause of action, but as support for my 
disclosure-mediated standard of care rule.240  My proposed rule will 
help to assuage the concern held in the field of medicine that there is 
a disconnect between the ideal of fiduciary duty and the realism of 
practice.241  It would address the problem that patients are not always 
informed that medical students, residents, and interns are examining 
them or will be performing their treatment under the supervision of 
a doctor for the benefit of medical training.242 
A number of courts have recognized that a physician owes a 
fiduciary duty to his patients when subject to a potential conflict of 
interest.  Most notably, the Supreme Court of California held that the 
duty to obtain informed consent includes a duty to disclose personal 
research or economic interests unrelated to the patient’s health.243  
Failure to disclose such potentially conflicting interests may violate 
the duty to secure informed consent and the fiduciary duty owed by 
the attending physician to the patient.244  A fiduciary obligation would 
                                                          
consumerism as the “reining metaphor,” the autonomy and self-determination 
interests of patients seem paramount under either the fiduciary or consumerism 
characterization and both characterizations advocate for an increase in the amount 
of information available to the consumer-patient.  Rodwin, supra note 228, at 153. 
 239. Furrow, supra note 238, at 56  
 240. Cf. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 498-500 (Ill. 2000).  The plaintiff 
alleged, in a wrongful death claim, that defendant physician’s failure to order an 
angiogram for her husband resulted in his failure to diagnose her husband’s 
impending fatal heart attack.  The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant breached 
a fiduciary obligation by failing to disclose that incentives existing under the 
defendant’s arrangement with the patient’s health maintenance organization 
(HMO) put the defendant’s financial well-being in direct conflict with the patient’s 
physical well-being.  Id. at 499.  In her second count, the plaintiff further claimed 
that that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty by refusing to authorize further 
testing or refer the patient to a specialist.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Illinois 
declined to recognize a new, separate cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty 
under these circumstances because such a claim duplicated the traditional medical 
negligence claim, which the court found would sufficiently address the same alleged 
misconduct.  Id. at 503.  But the court did hold that evidence of the HMO incentive 
plan might be relevant if the defendant testified in the medical negligence trial on 
possible issues of credibility and bias on cross-examination.  Id. at 506. 
 241. Rodwin, supra note 237, at 247 (explaining that although physicians think of 
themselves as fiduciaries and courts sometimes label physicians as fiduciaries, that 
such legal fiduciary principles have been applied to physicians only in limited 
instances, such as obtaining patients’ informed consent prior to treatment). 
 242. Rodwin, supra note 228, at 151. 
 243. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990); see supra 
note 163. 
 244. Id. at 485; see also Morris, supra note 154, at 361 (discussing the importance of 
being able to trust one’s physician).  Morris goes on to say: 
If, however, the physician has a financial or other interest that conflicts, or 
even potentially conflicts, with the physician’s fiduciary duty to the patient’s 
health, but does not reveal that conflict to the patient, the physician betrays 
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be kindled in the resident-treatment context because of the potential 
conflict between, on the one hand, the patient’s health and 
autonomy interests, and, on the other, the resident’s interest in 
advancing his education, society’s interest in an educated medical 
profession, and hospitals’ interest in meeting their staffing 
requirements with the inexpensive cadre of residents.  As Barry 
Furrow has darkly noted, “[t]he tension in the fiduciary disclosure 
cases is tangible—a physician must rescue a patient from the 
physician’s own mixed motivations and conflicts of interest between 
the patient’s good and his own.  The rescuer and the person posing a 
danger are folded into the same person.”245 
The disclosure rule that I contemplate is animated by a softer glove 
than if such disclosures were mediated through an unvarnished 
expansion of the informed consent doctrine, with its slippery slope 
and manifold causation complexities.246  As evidenced by the universal 
adoption of the carrot of Good Samaritan Laws, physicians seem to 
need encouragement to be Good Samaritans.247  My approach 
similarly relies on the promise of a more forgiving, experience-based 
standard of care to encourage disclosure.  Not only does it avoid the 
casuistries of informed consent, but it also provides residents with a 
readily available window through which to avail themselves of a more 
forgiving, experience-based standard of care. 
This construct is more true to the spirit of a fault-based system of 
malpractice.  How can these residents be deemed at fault if their 
performance was consistent with their novice status as participants in 
graduate medical education?  This compromise also reflects a more 
flexible and all-encompassing idea of duty, one with a necessarily 
broader spectrum of beneficiaries than exclusively the patient.248  
                                                          
that trust.  If the physician knows of his or her own obvious physical 
infirmities (HIV-positive status, substance abuse) or inexperience that may 
increase the risk of harm to the patient, but does not disclose them to the 
patient, the physician betrays that trust. 
Id.  In discussing the holding in Moore, Morris reasons: 
After all, if a surgeon’s HIV-positive status must be revealed because it 
nominally increases the patient’s risk of contracting the AIDS virus, a 
surgeon’s research interest or economic interest that may influence a 
surgeon to recommend surgery that subjects the patient to all the risks of 
harm inherent in that operation and all the consequences of that operation, 
should require a similar disclosure. 
 Id. at 353-54. 
 245. Furrow, supra note 238, at 52.  
 246. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text (addressing the complications 
that are inherent in the informed consent doctrine in this context). 
 247. Furrow, supra note 238, at 52 (discussing statutes that may, in some 
circumstances, lessen potential liability for physicians who render emergency aid). 
 248. Rodwin, supra note 237, at 242.  Professor Rodwin asserts: 
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Professor Marc Rodwin notes the possibility of balancing the inherent 
competing interests of the patient, physician, hospital, and society 
within a fiduciary framework, as long as doctors properly disclosed all 
relevant information to their patients.249 
C.  “Hell No—I Want a Real Doctor” and Other Perturbations 
The proposed disclosure-facilitating rule admittedly carries with it 
possible complications.  What if the patient, after being told of a 
resident’s status, responds, “Hell no.  I want a ‘real doctor.’”?  Now 
what?  This is why it is important to reach an understanding with 
patients in advance so that if necessary, other arrangements can be 
made.  Thus, if a patient demurs, the parties should consider trying 
to reach agreement on one of the following alternatives:  an agreed 
level of resident participation; an understanding that the resident will 
not care for the patient; or, an understanding that the attending 
physician should primarily care for the patient without the resident’s 
full participation. If the foregoing accommodations are not 
acceptable, then the attending physician overseeing the resident may, 
after providing reasonable notice to the patient affording a 
reasonable opportunity for care by other providers, want to consider 
withdrawing from the case if otherwise consistent with rules 
regarding the duration and termination of the physician patient 
relationship.   In any event, patients should remember that it may, or 
may not, be true that a predictably (statistically) better outcome 
would be achieved at a non-teaching hospital as compared to a 
teaching hospital, even if the latter is staffed in part with residents. 
The condition of the patient and the time pressures of emergency 
care may also be complicating factors.  How does a resident disclose 
to an unconscious patient (or his surrogates) with a life-threatening 
gunshot wound who is rushed by ambulance to an emergency room?  
                                                          
[H]ealth policy now focuses on the population rather than individual 
patients.  Given the formidable costs of medical care and the increasing 
dependence of doctors on organizations that employ and pay for their 
services, physician loyalty is weakened for patients and strengthened for 
other parties.  These facts suggest that the law may consider the interests of 
these other groups in the future and that other metaphors may more aptly 
describe patient-physician relationships.  Nonetheless, there is reason to 
think that the law will continue to address strained physician loyalty within a 
fiduciary framework.  It may impose limits on and stretch the fiduciary 
metaphor to reconcile obligations of doctors to patients with service to 
groups and society. 
Id. 
 249. Id. at 255-56 (explaining that many fiduciaries have to balance varying 
interests of competing individuals or groups). 
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Should precious time during the “golden hour”250 be spent educating 
accident victims (or their surrogates) about the nature of residency 
programs and graduate medical education? 
There may also be questions about what information should 
constitute sufficient disclosure to entitle the residents to the more 
forgiving, experience-based standard of care.  The disclosure should 
not depend on the patient specifically asking—“are you a resident?”251  
Nor should the resident be entitled to assume that everyone knows 
who the residents are and what the term “resident” means.252  And, of 
course, the disclosure should be communicated directly to the 
patient (or surrogate).253 
That said, we must remember that there are competing interests 
here.  As Professor Mark Hall has counseled in another context, we 
must develop rules of medical disclosure that can reconcile legal 
idealism with economic necessity.254  Educating residents in order to 
develop future specialists is essential to our health care system.  At the 
margins, there may also be concerns that as disclosures proliferate to 
include potential conflicting interests—here, in the educational 
                                                          
 250. The “golden hour” is the sixty minutes following an injury.  See E. Brooke 
Lerner & Ronald M. Moscati, The Golden Hour:  Scientific Fact or Medical “Urban 
Legend”?, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 758, 758 (2001) (explaining that the term reflects 
the belief that trauma patients have better outcomes if they receive medical care 
within an hour of sustaining an injury).  The concept of the golden hour appears to 
have evolved during the Vietnam War, where the survival rate in medical facilities 
increased by two percent from previous wars and the time between injury and 
treatment was reduced to one hour, down from approximately five hours in the 
Korean War.  Id. at 759. 
 251. For the classic statement on this in the informed consent context, see 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  The Canterbury Court 
states:  “We discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before 
the physician is required to disclose.  Caveat emptor is not the norm for the 
consumer of medical services.”  See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed 
Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 563 (1997) (citing Canterbury and its theory that patients 
lack a level of sophistication necessary to apply caveat emptor in the arena of medical 
services, in rejecting a so-called “transparency standard” that obligates patients to ask 
questions of doctors when further explanation or clarification is needed). 
 252. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (referring to the passage in 
Gawande’s book, COMPLICATIONS, where he discusses how much easier it is to ask the 
necessary questions about a resident’s involvement in a surgical procedure when one 
has a medical background and thus an appreciation of who the “players” are in the 
surgical context). 
 253. Cf. Grant v. Douglas Woman’s Clinic, 580 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(stating that a doctor’s notation on the patient’s medical chart that the doctor had 
“nothing to add” did not constitute reasonable notice to the patient of the doctor’s 
unilateral decision to withdraw from the relationship and enable the patient to 
obtain substitute care). 
 254. See Hall, supra note 251, at 515 (discussing the compromise that exists when 
patients are on medical welfare or a more affordable form of limited, non-
comprehensive health insurance because under these systems, patients no longer 
have complete financial autonomy to order any and all beneficial medical treatment 
available). 
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advancement of the resident—not only will patients be stressed and 
distracted by having to decide how to react, especially when a 
negative reaction may be perceived as impugning the professional 
standing of an inexperienced resident, but the overall effect may 
undermine the level of trust between the patient and the health-care 
professionals who care for him.255 
How then might the contemplated resident disclosure be 
streamlined without it disintegrating into a rote “medical Miranda 
warning?”256  Here are some suggestions as to how this might work.  
Medical workers should consider a global disclosure at the first 
meeting between the patient and a resident (or his supervising 
physician) with ongoing responsibilities.257  Professor Hall has 
discussed the practical need for what he terms “bundling” of consent.  
“Bundled consent,” he says, is “how we now view a single decision to 
be hospitalized or to undergo surgery.  These decisions are taken as 
                                                          
 255. See id. at 548 (commenting, in connection with disclosures of a physician’s 
potentially conflicting financial interests, that “[i]t is difficult to see how patient trust 
could survive ongoing disclosures of this nature, yet it is patient trust that informed 
consent is designed to foster,” and quoting the experience of one physician in an 
HMO gatekeeping capacity that “the collective impact of these negative encounters, 
though each in itself might have been minor, created a climate of suspicion, 
cynicism, readiness to fight, and a sense of being used that permeated my office in a 
way that I had not known before”). 
 256. Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About Informed Consent, 
156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2522 (1996) (asserting that “[a]s practiced, and 
certainly as symbolized by consent forms, informed consent is often no more than a 
medical Miranda warning”).  The danger of the meaningless, rote disclosures is a 
special concern once a patient is admitted to a hospital.  Professor Cathy Jones 
explains: 
The actual process of informed consent falls even shorter of its theoretical 
goals, however, once the patient is admitted.  At least two reasons contribute 
to this shortcoming:  first, the “status” of the in-patient . . . . The second 
reason for the further decline in the application of the informed consent 
procedures once patients are hospitalized is that so much of what occurs in 
the hospital is “routine” (at least to the providers), and therefore, the 
providers do not deem formal disclosure and consent requirements to be 
necessary.  The notion of routineness and lack of necessity to make 
disclosure or seek consent for many procedures performed on patients once 
they enter hospitals is reinforced by the admitting process. 
Jones, supra note 156, at 404-06. 
 257. Hall contends: 
Some global disclosure of cost containment incentives, rules, and 
mechanisms is required at the outset of enrollment, although this presently 
is not done.  If such a disclosure can be accomplished, it would validate at 
least some subsequent cost containment decisions without the need for 
doctors to make (non)treatment-specific disclosures at the bedside.  This 
results from either a bundled consent conception or from a waiver of 
consent conception.  For either of these characterizations to hold, however, 
some meaningful choice must exist at the time of insurance enrollment, a 
choice that does not presently exist for many—perhaps the majority—of 
subscribers to managed care plans. 
Hall, supra note 251, at 582. 
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entailing consent to hundreds of discrete events of testing, 
medication, and bodily examination during the course of what may 
be a rather long and complex episode of treatment.”258  Bundling is 
consistent with modern “relational contracting” theory, which 
contemplates that: 
[I]t is unrealistic to impose on patients and physicians the 
impossible burden of specifying the minutiae of an explicit 
contractual standard of medical practice.  Instead, the law assumes 
that doctors, when they take on the care of a patient, automatically 
promise the bundle of unspecified treatment obligations entailed 
in customary professional practice.  Patients cannot assert that they 
are not governed by the conventional practice standard simply 
because they lack specific notice of its content.  When patients 
choose generalists over specialists, or choose non-physician allied 
health professionals or practitioners of holistic medicine, it is taken 
for granted that a lower or different standard of care applies 
without the need to specifically warn patients that superior care 
may be available elsewhere.259 
Following the initial global disclosure and consent, specific 
additional disclosures might be appropriate.  Medical residents with 
functional responsibility for a patient should disclose what his 
responsibilities will be in connection with general management of the 
patient’s care and with respect to each diagnostic or therapeutic 
medical procedure for which a separate, discrete disclosure or 
warning of the risks is required under the applicable rules of 
informed consent.260  These disclosures should include information 
on the residents’ responsibilities for preoperative decisionmaking; 
actual performance of, or functional responsibilities for, surgical, 
diagnostic, or other discrete procedures; and the resident’s post-
operative management and decisionmaking role. 
A question may arise as to whether my test would require the 
disclosure of comparative performance statistics by the resident.  In 
                                                          
 258. Id.  at 559. 
 259. Id.  at 560.  Hall elaborates: 
This practice is consistent with legal doctrine, which presumes that, by 
submitting oneself to treatment, a patient consents, absent any objection, to 
the many minor bits and pieces that make up the entire treatment 
encounter.  This “bundling” concept of informed consent arises by legal 
implication even though the patient receives no risk/benefit disclosure 
about each of these component parts. 
Id. at 553. 
 260. Recall that my suggested approach is not based on informed consent per se, 
but rather uses the scope of disclosure rules simply to define the range of 
appropriate disclosure in order to determine the standard of care that will be 
applied to medical residents. 
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general, I would say no.  First, given the diversity of backgrounds and 
experiences among residents and the varied hospital settings in 
which they serve, it would seldom be feasible to attempt relevant 
statistical comparisons.  Any attempt at statistical comparisons would 
also be thwarted by the fact that much of what a resident does will 
presumably have been done under some level of supervision, albeit of 
decidedly mixed quality, by more senior physicians.  Morbidity and 
mortality outcomes may thus be a function of the quality and level of 
supervision and involvement by the attending physician overseeing 
the resident.  Thus, performance outcomes may reflect other 
variables in addition to the capacities of the resident.  On a heuristic 
level, there may also be cognitive biases and limitations that challenge 
patients’ comprehension of statistical information,261 especially when 
communicated in the highly stressful treatment environment. 
The matter of residents and disclosure remains a quandary, as Dr. 
Gawande again forthrightly reminds us from the trenches: 
 We find it hard, in medicine, to talk about this with patients.  
The moral burden of practicing on people is always with us, but for 
the most part unspoken.  Before each operation, I go over to the 
pre-operative holding area in my scrubs and introduce myself to 
the patient.  I do it the same way every time.  “Hello, I’m Dr. 
Gawande.  I’m one of the surgical residents, and I’ll be assisting 
your surgeon.”  That is pretty much all I say on the subject.  I 
extend my hand and give a smile.  I ask the patient if everything is 
going OK so far.  We chat.  I answer questions.  Very occasionally, 
patients are taken aback.  “No resident is doing my surgery,” they 
say.  I try to reassure.  “Not to worry.  I just assist,” I say.  “The 
attending surgeon is always in charge.” 
 None of this is exactly a lie.  The attending is in charge, and a 
resident knows better than to forget that.  Consider the operation I 
                                                          
 261. See Hall, supra note 251, at 570-71.  Hall comments: 
Most lay people (and even many doctors) suffer from a number of cognitive 
biases and limitations in comprehending statistical probabilities, which 
include:  . . . Giving disproportionate weight to memorable, personalized 
anecdotes—that Uncle Fred died from heart surgery is more important than 
all the other information; . . . Exaggerating risk information by disassociating 
it from its base rate of prevalence—harm to forty percent of people with 
condition X is viewed as a high risk, even though condition X is very rare; . . . 
Underestimating disjunctive probabilities and overestimating conjunctive 
ones—where there is a fifty percent chance of harm A and a fifty percent 
chance of harm B, people fail to perceive that the probability of either A or B 
occurring is seventy-five percent but the probability of A and B occurring is 
only twenty-five percent; and . . . Having different perceptions of the same 
odds depending on whether they are framed in positive or negative terms—
five percent chance of failure vs. ninety-five percent chance of success. 
Id. 
KING.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  3:08:07 PM 
2006] THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR RESIDENTS 749 
did recently to remove a seventy-five-year-old woman’s colon 
cancer.  The attending stood across from me from the start.  And it 
was he, not I, who decided where to cut, how to isolate the cancer, 
how much colon to take. 
 Yet to say I just assisted remains a kind of subterfuge.  I wasn’t 
merely an extra pair of hands, after all.  Otherwise, why did I hold 
the knife?  Why did I stand on the operator’s side of the table?  
Why was it raised to my six-feet-plus height?  I was there to help, 
yes, but I was there to practice, too.  This was clear when it came 
time to reconnect the colon. There are two ways of putting the 
ends together—by hand-sewing them or stapling them.  Stapling is 
swifter and easier, but the attending suggested I hand-sew the 
ends—not because it was better for the patient but because I had 
done it few times before.  When it’s performed correctly, the 
results are similar, but he needed to watch me like a hawk.  My 
stitching was slow and imprecise.  At one point, he caught me 
leaving the stitches too far apart and made me go back and put 
extras in between so the connection would not leak.  At another 
point, he found I wasn’t taking deep enough bites of tissue with the 
needle to insure a strong closure.  “Turn your wrist more,” he told 
me.  “Like this?” I asked.  “Uh, sort of,” he said.  I was learning.262 
In addition to disclosures, both globally at the initial meeting and 
then again prior to the surgery to detail more explicitly the 
contemplated respective roles of the attending physician or surgeon 
and the surgical residents, there are a number of possible innovative 
techniques to facilitate patient comprehension of the information 
provided.263  The point is that if a resident wishes to be judged by a 
more forgiving, experienced-based standard of care, then a sincere 
and reasonable effort to inform the patient about that resident’s level 
of experience and contemplated involvement seems a suitable 
counterpoise. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical resident physicians are commonly named as defendants in 
connection with injuries suffered by patients who received treatment 
at hospitals, and vicarious liability claims against hospitals and others 
depend on whether their employee-residents had committed tortious 
                                                          
 262. GAWANDE, supra note 1, at 23. 
 263. See Jones, supra note 156, at 411-19 (mentioning that tape recording 
conversations between the physician and the patient, providing the patient with 
brochures or videotapes detailing the patient’s proposed treatment, and ensuring 
that another person accompanies the patient in these conversations are among the 
possible techniques a medical caregiver can use to enhance a patient’s 
understanding). 
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conduct.  This Article explored the question of how the standard of 
care rules for medical residents should be formulated.  More 
specifically, it asked the question of whether medical residents should 
be held to the level of expertise expected of reasonably competent 
generalist physicians, to specialists in the area of their residency, to a 
more subjective standard reflecting the level and stage of training of 
the particular resident physician in question, or in accordance with 
some other rule.  These important questions have been given short 
shrift by the courts. 
The question of the appropriate standard of care for medical 
residents is complicated by the presence of competing interests.  This 
underlying tension springs from the need to accommodate two 
potentially antagonistic or dissonant goals.  On the one hand, 
patients’ health is, and their lives are, at risk because patients are 
treated by residents every day.  A significant quantum of the health 
care in the United States is delivered by medical-school graduates 
who are engaged in post-graduate residency programs.  But moving 
from the microcosm to the long-term perspective, the health and 
safety of us all depends on residents learning their profession in a 
comprehensive way.  Residency programs are vital components in the 
education and training of physicians for the independent practice of 
medicine.  This is particularly true for the growing majority of 
physicians today who undertake to practice a specialty.  The 
challenge is to arrive at an approach that strikes a sensible balance 
between the health, safety, and autonomy of patients, while 
simultaneously accommodating the need for essential clinical 
education of residents.  Analysis of these underlying conflicting 
interests has too often been absent, or at best, desultory and 
inconsistent. 
In Part I of this Article, I provided an overview of medical residency 
programs.  Part II briefly examined the approaches of the courts to 
the question of the standard of care for medical residents, and also a 
critical assessment of the potential use of the doctrine of informed 
consent to address the matter of the relationship between residents 
and patients.  Part III proposed a different approach.  Rather than 
mediate the matter of treatment by medical residents exclusively 
through either the standard of care or the doctrine of informed 
consent (or some other information-based theory of liability), I 
proposed a solution that melds the two doctrines. 
This solution may be summarized as follows:  when medical 
residents (both not-yet-licensed and licensed ones) fully disclose their 
status, including their experience, training, education, and 
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credentials, to their patients, their performance should then be 
judged by a standard of care commensurate with their actual level of 
post-graduate medical training, education, and experience.  Licensed 
residents should, in addition and as a minimum, be held to the 
standard of a licensed general practitioner.  A resident (either 
licensed or not-yet-fully-licensed) who either affirmatively misstates or 
fails to disclose his status will not be permitted to avail himself of the 
standard commensurate with his limited experience and training.  If 
a resident affirmatively misrepresents his credentials and experience, 
then he should at least be held to the standard corresponding to the 
professional background that he claims to possess.  When a resident 
fails to appropriately disclose his status, a not-yet-fully-licensed 
resident should be held to the standard of care expected of a fully-
licensed physician who has completed his internship.  A non-
disclosing licensed resident actively participating in a graduate 
medical program to prepare him for a medical specialty should be 
held to the standard of the specialty covered by his residency 
program when serving the capacity of a specialist, unless he can prove 
that the patient’s reasonable expectations were of some less-
demanding standard, in which case he will be held to a standard 
commensurate with those expectations. 
I believe that the foregoing approach represents a sensible 
compromise between the competing interests of the safety of those 
patients that are being treated by residents, and the longer term 
interests in a health-care system that can offer its patients treatment 
by well-trained physicians, particularly specialists.  The contours of 
the suggested approach also afford a predictable and workable 
standard to the courts, physicians, and patients. 
 
